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REGULATION OF BOOK MARKETS 
MIRIAM MARCOWITZ-BITTON* & JACOB NUSSIM** 
ABSTRACT 
Over the years, many European countries have regulated their national 
book markets. Chief among the regulatory schemes is the resale price 
maintenance (“RPM”) regime, under which booksellers must offer books 
for a fixed price for a limited time period. The suggested rationales for this 
legal regime are mainly: (1) viewing books as cultural goods that deserve 
special treatment; (2) advancing diversity in the book market; (3) creating 
a wide distribution of and accessibility to books; and (4) supporting small 
booksellers. This Article explores the normative rationales for the RPM 
regime’s adoption and design in book markets. The RPM regime has been 
discussed and analyzed using a positive economic framework, but its 
application in reality has been missing a normative theoretical basis. This 
Article demonstrates that absent such a theoretical basis, policymaking is 
meaningless. Policymakers as well as courts cannot solely rely on positive 
economic analysis. Normative analysis is inevitable. This Article explores 
the missing normative analysis of RPM regimes in the context of book 
markets. It exposes an important blind spot in regulatory policy and judicial 
judgment. Lastly, the normative framework introduced in this Article may 
prove relevant for American RPM arrangements. Since American antitrust 
scrutiny of RPM schemes recently transformed from a per se rule to a rule 
of reason analysis, American policymakers and courts are expected to 
encounter a new wave of resurfacing RPM schemes. 
  
 
* Associate Professor, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law. 
** Professor, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law. 
We thank Ori Faust and Amy Wolf for excellent research assistance. 
 











TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 836 
I. THE ARRANGEMENT OF BOOK PRICES IN EUROPE AND BEYOND ....... 839 
A. Uniform and Fixed Book Prices ...................................................... 839 
B. Historical Background .................................................................... 840 
C. The Objectives of Modern RPM Regulation ................................... 844 
D. RPM Arrangements in European and Other Countries’ Book Markets 
  ........................................................................................................ 847 
E. Objections to Regulation ................................................................. 855 
F. Effects of Arrangements ................................................................... 861 
1. Effects on Pricing and Number of Titles ..................................... 862 
2. Effects on Diversity ..................................................................... 869 
3. Effects on the Number of Booksellers and Online Stores ........... 870 
4. Effects on Services’ Competition ................................................ 871 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF BOOK MARKETS ............................................. 872 
III. RPM ARRANGEMENTS: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ................................. 874 
A. Positive Analysis ............................................................................. 875 
B. Normative Analysis ......................................................................... 880 
1. Culture, Art, and Literature ........................................................ 882 
a. Definition and Meaning .......................................................... 883 
b. Public Economics ................................................................... 884 
c. Aesthetics ................................................................................ 887 
2. Diversity ...................................................................................... 893 
a. Definition and Meaning .......................................................... 894 
b. Normative Analysis ................................................................ 897 
CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................... 900 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The extent of legal intervention in markets has always been a highly 
contested and complex social question. A notable example is the “resale 
price maintenance” (“RPM”) scheme used in many European countries to 
regulate national book markets. For more than a century, RPM 
arrangements have faced ambivalent views among legal scholars, 
economists, policymakers, and the public.1 These views range from outright 
rejections of RPM schemes to varying degrees of acceptance to regulatory 
RPM mandates. 
 
1. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance, 
3 ISSUES COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 1841, 1855–56 (2008); Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, Resale Price 












These views have affected legal rules in many countries, and have also 
significantly transformed the legal treatment of RPM arrangements in the 
United States. In the last hundred years, the legal treatment of RPM schemes 
went from outright illegal under a per se rule,2 to a more limited 
applicability of per se illegality,3 and then to four decades of statutory 
exclusions of RPM arrangements under “fair trade” laws, which 
encompassed almost all states as well as an exemption on the federal level.4 
However, courts tended to reject or limit these state laws, which were finally 
eliminated by federal legislation in 1975.5 Soon after, the tide turned again 
with the Supreme Court moving, over a period of three decades, from per 
se illegality, to a rule of reason application, to vertical restraints,6 including 
RPM arrangements.7 Yet, states’ authorities now support outright 
prohibition of RPM.8 
Overseas, one witnesses less legal variation, but still an ambivalent 
attitude toward RPM agreements. Although generally disallowed, as RPM 
remains per se illegal under EC Competition Law, RPM agreements are 
supported in several specific markets—chief among them book markets. 
Several European countries allow for RPM agreements in book markets, 
which subject retailers to fixed book prices. While some European countries 
have rejected RPM arrangements altogether, in other prominent countries 
these arrangements have been stable for decades or even a century. 
Economists have debated RPM schemes for as long as these 
arrangements have existed.9 Our main argument is that the positive 
economic theory of RPM regimes is insufficient. Adoption of regulatory 
regimes requires normative analysis, which is not found in the economic 
literature. In this Article, we focus on this neglected part in the economic 
 
2. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
3. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
4. See L. Louise Luchsinger & Patrick M. Dunne, Fair Trade Laws – How Fair? What Lessons 
Can Be Drawn that Would Guide Us in the Future?, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1978, at 50, 51. 
5. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see generally LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER, AMERICAN FAIR TRADE: 
PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE “NEW COMPETITION,” 1890–1940 (2018). 
6. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717 (1988); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also D. Daniel Sokol, 
The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality, 
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003 (2014) (working through the transformation in case law).  
7. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); see also Special 
Issue, Resale Price Maintenance a Decade After Leegin, 50 REV. INDUS. ORGS. 129 (2017) (collecting 
academic commentary on RPM). 
8. See Heather M. Cooper, SHEPPARD MULLIN, Debate on Resale Price Maintenance Heats Up, 
ANTITRUST L. BLOG (Nov. 10, 2009), https://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2009/11/articles/uncategorized 
/debate-on-resale-price-maintenance-heats-up/ [https://perma.cc/88CD-MUYT]. 
9. William Breit, Resale Price Maintenance: What Do Economists Know and When Did They 
Know It?, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 72 (1991). 











analysis—the normative theory and application of RPM regimes. A 
normative theory is crucial for any evaluation of an RPM arrangement, 
whether wide, limited, or piecemeal. Further, a normative theory has 
become much needed under the new rule of reason that applies to RPM 
arrangements in the United States. Any legal analysis of and decision 
regarding RPM arrangements, whether by policymakers or courts, is 
meaningless without a founded normative theory. 
This Article offers and demonstrates a normative application of RPM 
regimes and their incidence in European book markets. European book 
markets function as a well-entrenched case study of RPM regimes. The 
background and stated goals of proponents of RPM arrangements in book 
markets are reminiscent of the common arguments found everywhere in 
support of RPM regimes, and are particularly similar to the stated rationales 
of past United States fair trade laws and current arguments in defense of a 
rule of reason application to RPM schemes. Thus, a careful normative study 
of RPM regimes in European book markets informs us about regulation of 
RPM arrangements in general. 
The analysis focuses on the background for the adoption of RPM regimes 
in European book markets and explores to what extent RPM regimes can 
realize their stated goals. We introduce a normative framework for adoption 
of RPM regimes in book markets that is necessary in order both to make an 
informed decision regarding such a regime’s adoption ex ante and to assess 
its success ex post. The normative requirements are not easily met, and our 
study shows that they were not encountered by policymakers. Accordingly, 
this Article demonstrates and emphasizes the normative failure of RPM 
regulation in European book markets. These RPM regimes are arguably 
baseless. This regulatory anatomy of RPM regimes should find its way into 
the legal analysis of RPM schemes in the United States. This is not 
necessarily a call for the elimination of RPM arrangements in the United 
States or for per se illegality. Instead, it is a call for careful regulatory and 
judicial application of normative theory. It is particularly important once a 
rule of reason applies. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a detailed overview 
regarding regulation of European book markets. First, it considers the 
structure and details of an RPM regime. Second, it provides the historical 
background and rationale for the adoption of RPM regimes in these 
markets. Third, it discusses modern RPM regulations and their objectives, 
including the rationales for the adoption of book RPM regimes in major 
European countries. Fourth, the Article progresses to a discussion of major 
objections to book RPM regulation, mainly touching on anticompetitive 
concerns that have been raised over the years as well as other objections. 












pointing to the lack of clear evidence for either the success or the failure of 
such regimes in achieving their stated goals. Part II proceeds to characterize 
book markets more generally. Part III offers the major contribution of this 
Article, providing a careful economic analysis of RPM arrangements, 
suggesting that a positive analysis of RPM regimes is insufficient and that 
a normative analysis is essential and inevitable, exposing an important blind 
spot in regulatory policy and judicial judgment. 
I. THE ARRANGEMENT OF BOOK PRICES IN EUROPE AND BEYOND  
A. Uniform and Fixed Book Prices 
Several European and other countries have adopted a regulatory 
arrangement known as fixed book prices, which is a type of resale price 
maintenance (RPM). The RPM arrangement grants—contractually or 
regulatorily—the producer the legal right to determine consumer market 
prices down the production chain. Thus, the typical regulatory arrangement 
in book markets allows a publisher to fix consumer prices across each and 
every bookstore, thereby forming a uniform price in the book market. The 
prices are commonly fixed for a certain period of time from the publication 
date, after which the arrangement dissipates, and market prices may vary 
according to bookstores’ decisions. RPM arrangements include additional 
variables, such as the type and extent of permitted discounts, necessary 
agreements between publishers and bookstores, etc.10  
Book market RPM arrangements do not allow bookstores to compete on 
book prices during the protected period but do allow competition between 
publishers or between writers and publishers. Under the RPM regime, the 
signed contract between the publishers and the bookstores or book chain 
stores determines profit margins.  
Since the retail price is fixed for consumers, the price determined 
between a publisher and an individual bookstore represents that store’s 
profit margin on each book. 
Therefore, even though the established consumer price prevents 
competition between bookstores, the profit margins of different stores will 
vary as a result of their bargaining positions with the publisher. On the one 
side, retailers’ profit margins are protected in publishing contracts, and, on 
the other side, by fixed market prices.  
 
10. See generally infra Part I.B. Historical Background. 











B. Historical Background  
Historically, book markets have been regulated for many years, at first 
mainly in certain European countries such as Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
Later, regulation expanded to other European countries. In the early days, 
regulation of book markets was done mainly through contractual 
arrangements in the book industry.  
In Germany, the Börsenverein, the German Publishers and Booksellers 
Association, first introduced price-fixing regulation of books in 1888.11 The 
rationale for this regulation was to promote science and research, and to 
ensure the diversity of books by using profits from best sellers to support 
risky “literary experiments,” such as new authors and unusual titles, thus 
protecting books as cultural assets.12 Bittlingmayer attributed the 
development of this regime to the constant attempts of local booksellers 
since the early 1800s to eliminate discounts and promote their own 
economic interests.13 The 1888 regulations prohibited discounting from 
price lists but allowed exemptions based on either regional differences or 
sales to large buyers.14 Noncompliance was punished through social and 
economic sanctions, such as boycotts or exclusion from membership 
benefits in the associations.15 The regulation was reestablished in the 1950s 
following World War II.16 The agreements were firmly enforced by the 
courts and the Federal Cartel Office.17 In 1957, German cartel law explicitly 
allowed book RPM arrangements, subject to the registration and approval 
of the Federal Cartel Office.18 Subsequently, with the Federal Cartel 
Office’s blessing, the Börsenverein initiated the Sammelrevers, a system of 
single contracts, that was used by all players in the industry and 
 
11. Past and Present: The History of the German Publishers & Booksellers Association, 
BÖRSENVEREIN DES DEUTSCHEN BUCHANDELS [GERMAN PUBLISHERS & BOOKSELLERS 
ASSOCIATION], https://www.boersenverein.de/de/394814 [https://perma.cc/T69E-RTCY]. 
12. Id. 
13. George Bittlingmayer, Resale Price Maintenance in the Book Trade with an Application to 
Germany, 144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 789, 799–801 (1988).  
14. Id. at 803. It should be noted that some of the exceptions in the 1903 scheme, such as the 
discount for large buyers or the 5 percent discount for libraries, were adopted in the modern RPM law. 
See id.  
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 804. 
17. Id. at 804–05. 












administered by an independent trustee.19 Only in 2002 were these voluntary 
regulations replaced by legislation.20  
The history of price regulation of books in both Austria and Switzerland 
is intertwined with and affected by its German counterpart.21 The history of 
price regulation of books in Austria dates back to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.22 At first, the practice of reprinting books and selling 
them at cheaper prices was widely accepted in Austria and was also 
perceived as a proper means to promote literacy throughout the country.23 
In 1889, the Austrian Book Association adopted the regulations imposed by 
the German Börsenverein and adapted them to the Austro-Hungarian book 
trade, setting a fixed price for books.24 These regulations were recognized 
by the Austrian courts, and, under the 1951 Competition Act, publisher-
retailer agreements concerning books were recognized as an exception to 
competition rules.25 It was not until the accession of Austria to the European 
Union in the 1990s that the Sammelrevers were extended to include Austria 
and Switzerland.26 The Swiss book industry was part of the Sammelrevers 
system, which served as a form of fixed price regulation on books only with 
regards to German-speaking Switzerland.27 The motivation for joining the 
agreement was the unique cultural environment in Switzerland. As a 
multilingual country, Switzerland sought to preserve the languages of its 
minorities and accepted this cultural policy as a justification for joining 
these agreements despite their anticompetitive effects.28 However, by 1999, 
the Sammelrevers were rendered illegal by the Swiss Competition 
 
19. Id. at 805. 
20. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Annual Report on Competition Policy 
Developments in Germany (July 2001–June 2002), ¶ 8, DAFFE/COMP(2002)27/01 (Sept. 26, 2002), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAFFE/COMP(2002)27/01/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/8U49-XC52]. 
21. HANSPETER HANREICH ET AL., BUCHPREISREGELUNGEN IN EUROPA ALS MITTEL DER 
KULTURPOLITIK: WIRKSAMKEIT UND WOHLFAHRTSÖKONOMISCHE BEDEUTUNG 31 (2009) (Austria), 
https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/recent_publ/buchpreisb-eb_221009.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PFB-
XSKZ] (study commissioned by the Association of the Book and Media Industry, Austrian Federal 
Economic Chamber). 
22. Id.  
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 31–32.  
26. Id. at 32. 
27. OECD, Policy Roundtables: Resale Price Maintenance, at 147, OCDE/GD(97)229 (1997), 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/1920261.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ3G-C3RA] [hereinafter 
OECD Roundtable 1997]. 
28. HELGE RØNNING ET AL., NOR. MINISTRIES OF CULTURE & EDUC., TIL BOKAS PRIS: 
UTREDNING AV LITTERATURPOLITISKE VIRKEMIDLER I EUROPA [BOOKS—AT WHAT PRICE?: REPORT 
ON POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE PUBLISHING INDUSTRY IN EUROPE] 38 (Kevin Quirk et al. trans., 2012) 
(Nor.), http://www.europeanbooksellers.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Books-At-What-Price_Compl 
ete-00000002.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9MV-CQHA]. 











Commission due to their negative effects on competition.29 In Austria, the 
agreements expired in 1998, and the country adopted modern legislation in 
2000, as we discuss below.30 
Similarly, the single price mechanism in the French book industry has 
evolved from the voluntary “recommended prices” cartel agreements 
adopted from the end of the eighteenth century through the beginning of the 
twentieth century.31 The stated rationale for the adoption of these 
arrangements was to redistribute and spread the risks involved in the book 
market for publishers and booksellers, eventually allowing price 
coordination.32 The recommended retail price, printed by publishers on the 
covers of books, served as a reference point and as a means for coordination, 
and was generally respected by booksellers.33 This reality changed in the 
1970s due to major changes in the French book market, which triggered the 
introduction of the 1981 Lang Law.34 
The practice of RPM was known in the United Kingdom book industry 
since the nineteenth century. In 1829, the Booksellers Committee in London 
introduced RPM regulations that were intended to reinforce confidence and 
coordination between publishers and booksellers in an attempt to increase 
profits for both market players.35 In 1852, the arrangement was repealed, 
and the London Booksellers Committee closed down.36 This followed the 
findings of the Campbell Committee, which concluded that the organization 
was coercive and that their regulations were contrary to principles of free 
trade.37 In 1899, the newly established Association of Booksellers of Great 
Britain and Ireland reintroduced the RPM mechanism in the form of the Net 
Book Agreement (“NBA”).38 The support for this new agreement arose 
mainly because many of the booksellers were concerned by the generous 
discounts that a minority of large retailers offered to consumers, and its 
adoption was made possible mainly due to the growing power of organized 
 
29. OECD, Roundtable on Resale Price Maintenance 2008, at 57, DAF/COMP(2008)37 (Sept. 
10, 2009), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/43835526.pdf [https://perma.cc/MTH5-VNZB] 
[hereinafter OECD Roundtable 2008]. 
30. HANREICH ET AL., supra note 21, at 33. 
31. MATHIEU PERONA & JÉRÔME POUYET, CEPREMAP, LE PRIX UNIQUE DU LIVRE À L’HEURE 
DU NUMÉRIQUE 33 (2010) (Fr.), http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/opus/OPUS19.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6 
VM-JVJR]. 
32. Id. at 34–35.  
33. Id. at 34. 
34. Id. The French Act is named after Jack Lang, who was the French Minister of Culture in 
charge of passing the law. 
35. James A. Dearnley, The Decline and Fall of the Net Book Agreement 1962–1997: A Study 
of Cause and Effect 47–48 (Dec. 1997) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Loughborough University), https:// 
dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/28070 [https://perma.cc/J926-DAX7]. 
36. Id. at 48. 
37. Id.  












booksellers.39 By the 1920s, 70 percent of books were sold in accordance 
with the NBA.40 By World War II, the NBA had become the standard in the 
British book industry.41 Unlike France and Germany, the United Kingdom 
never adopted the NBA into legislation, as we discuss below.42 
In the Netherlands, the history of regulation of book prices begins with 
the establishment of the Royal Association of Book Trade in 1815 for the 
promotion of booksellers’ interests.43 Developments within the industry 
during the nineteenth century included growing division between 
booksellers and publishers, who subsequently formed their own 
associations and introduced significant risks and costs to booksellers.44 As 
a compromise between the parties’ conflicting interests, they drafted a fixed 
form of trade agreements between 1904 and 1924, marking the beginning 
of the fixed price regime in the Dutch book trade.45 The regulations were 
not strict, and the system resembled a medieval guild rather than a book 
cartel, as measures were rarely taken against violators.46 This system was 
eventually replaced by legislation.47 
Lastly, the Swedish book market has been heavily regulated since the 
nineteenth century and was considered one of the most regulated in Europe 
at the time.48 The Swedish Book Association was established in 1843 and 
was responsible for imposing restrictions on the practices of publishing and 
bookselling, including the regulation of distribution systems and fixed book 
prices.49 This system is also well-known as the Commission System. The 
introduction of the Commission System followed significant social and 
economic changes in Sweden.50 The rapid expansion of the Swedish book 
 
39. Id. at 48–49. 
40. Id. at 50. 
41. Id. at 50–51. 
42. See infra notes 125–131 and accompanying text. 
43. Joost Cornelis Adriaan Houdijk, Publieke Belangen in het Mededingingsrecht: Een 
Onderzoek in Vijf Domeinen 419, 424 (2009) (doctoral thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen) (Neth.), 
https://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/77600/mmubn000001_51815744x.pdf?sequence=1 
[https://perma.cc/SFJ6-46NJ].  
44. F. de Glas, Spelregels voor het boekenvak: Het Reglement voor het Handelsverkeer als 
Spiegel van de Ontwikkeling van het Boekenvak 1904–1961, in 1 JAARBOEK VOOR NEDERLANDSE 
BOEKGESCHIEDENIS 131, 132–33 (1994) (Neth.), https://www.dbnl.org/arch/_jaa008199501_01/pag/_j 
aa008199501_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX7A-DKUQ]. 
45. Id. at 135. 
46. Id. at 138. For further discussion, see id. at 139–41. 
47. RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 35. 
48. Ann Steiner, Selling Books and Digital Files: A Comparative Study of the Sales of Books and 
E-books in Sweden, 13 N. LIGHTS 11, 13 (2015). 
49. Id. 
50. Such changes include the introduction of freedom of the press (1809) and of compulsory 
public education in folk schools (1842), as well as general industrialization. See Johan Svedjedal, 
Kommissionssystemets Epok – Svensk Bokbransch 1843–1970, in BOKBRANSCHEN I SVERIGE: 
UTVECKLINGEN MELLAN 1973 OCH 2003: RAPPORT FRÅN SVENSKA BOKHANDLAREFÖRENINGEN OCH 
 











industry during the 1800s, during which books became widespread and 
common products in every household, led to the organization of its 
members.51 The rationale for adopting the system, which was led by the 
publishers, was to control the book trade through the imposition of strict 
restrictions on booksellers.52 Booksellers were admitted to the system only 
if found financially reliable by the Association, and they had to offer a wide 
selection of books, featuring titles of all Association members.53 
Booksellers were not allowed to compete with each other, and titles were 
sold for the same prices.54 The rules offered stability and order to all 
members in the industry, and this system was maintained for nearly 130 
years.55 In an attempt to reach new customer groups, some “free 
booksellers” existed alongside the “commissioner-approved” bookstores.56 
This continued through 1970.57  
C. The Objectives of Modern RPM Regulation 
Regulation of book markets has continued well into the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. Many European countries introduced price-fixing 
schemes into legislation, although some countries still regulate the book 
market through industry agreements. Several reasons and rationales are 
offered in support of RPM regulation in book markets. The starting point of 
much of the RPM regulation is that books, being essential cultural assets, 
should not be regarded as common economic products and therefore must 
be regulated by different rules.58  
One of the most commonly introduced objectives of RPM regimes is 
ensuring diversity, i.e., a wide range of books. For example, the laws in 
 
SVENSKA FÖRLÄGGAREFÖRENINGEN 8, 8 (2003) (Swed.), http://www.forlaggare.se/sites/default/files/b 
okbranschen_i_sverige_1973_till_2003_rapport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z747-9F6K] (report of the 
Swedish Booksellers Association and the Swedish Publishers Association). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 8–9. 
54. Id. at 9. 
55. Id. at 8, 12. 
56. Id. at 9. 
57. Id. at 12. 
58. See, e.g., Decreto-Lei n.º 176/96, de 21 de Setembro, Diário da República n.º 220/1996, Série 
I-A de 1996-09-21, 3309 (Port.), https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/215895/details/normal?p_p_auth=f1O 
AesSR [https://perma.cc/TS6H-W7K5] (explaining, in a preamble, the cultural value of books which 












Germany,59 Spain,60 Greece,61 the Netherlands,62 and Portugal63 state that 
ensuring diversity of books is a major goal. In Switzerland, a legislative 
arrangement adopted the RPM regime (which was canceled in a referendum 
about a year after its enactment)64 with the stated goal of encouraging the 
diversity of books.65  
Another major objective of some countries’ RPM regimes is to 
encourage the printing of high-quality books. This has been, for example, 
one of the stated objectives of the Norwegian industry agreements,66 the 
Spanish Act,67 and the Greek Act.68 In France the arrangement in the Lang 
Law also promotes quality titles, whose inventory turnover is slow, thus 
 
59. OECD Roundtable 2008, supra note 29, at 37; RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 38; 
Buchpreisbindungsgesetz [BuchPrG] [German Resale Price Maintenance Act], Sept. 2, 2002, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL I] at 3448, § 1, as amended by Gesetz [G], July 31, 2016, BGBL I 
at 1937 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/buchprg/BJNR344810002.html [https://perma.cc/3 
APG-T3NK], unofficial translation at http://www.berlinerbuchhandel.de/sixcms/media.php/976/Germa 
n_Resale_Price_Maintenance_Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2FX-2LW8] (Carol Wanske trans.). 
60. See, e.g., Ley 10/2007, de 22 de junio, de la lectura, del libro y de las bibliotecas [Lectures, 
Books & Libraries Law] (B.O.E. 2007, 12351) (Spain), https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A 
-2007-12351 [https://perma.cc/2QKL-2C7E]; Real Decreto 484/1990, de 30 de marzo, sobre precio de 
venta al público de libros [Book Publication Window Decree] (B.O.E. 1990, 9252) (Spain), https://www. 
boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1990-9252 [https://perma.cc/8BL8-5M7R]; Maria Luisa Palma 
Martos & Luís Palma Martos, Fixed Book Pricing in Spain: A Debate Between Economic Efficiency and 
Cultural Diversity, in CREATIVE CITIES, CULTURAL CLUSTERS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
137 (Philip Cooke & Luciana Lazzeretti eds., 2008). 
61. See Dionysios Batikas, Resale Price Maintenance with an Application to Books 25 (Feb. 29, 
2016) (unpublished postgraduate dissertation, Athens University of Economics and Business) (Greece), 
http://www.pyxida.aueb.gr/getfile.php?object_id=iid:5576&ds_id=PDF1 [https://perma.cc/UNQ5-2G 
DQ]; Nomos (1997:2557) Thesmoi, Metra kai Drosos Politistikes Anaptyxe [Institutions, Measures and 
Actions for Cultural Development] EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS 
[E.K.E.D.] 1997, A:271 (Greece), https://nomoi.info/%CE%A6%CE%95%CE%9A-%CE%91-271-199 
7-%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%BB-1.html. 
62. RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 40; Wet van 9 november 2004, Stb. 2004, 600 (Neth.), 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0017452/2016-07-01 [https://perma.cc/9BDA-WZ72]. 
63. Decreto-Lei n.º 176/96, de 21 de Setembro (Port.), https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/215895/de 
tails/normal?p_p_auth=f1OAesSR [https://perma.cc/TS6H-W7K5]. 
64. Moè Nakayama, For What It’s Worth: Fixed Book Price in Foreign Book Markets, PUB. 
TRENDS (May 12, 2015), http://www.publishingtrends.com/2015/05/for-what-its-worth-fixed-book-pric 
e-in-foreign-book-markets/ [https://perma.cc/85Z3-YEM5]; Bundesgesetz über die Buchpreisbindung 
[BuPG] [Federal Law on Book Prices], March 29, 2011, Bundesblatt [BBl] Nr. 13 at 2703 (Switz.), 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2011/2703.pdf [https://perma.cc/29FV-E6R7]. 
65. RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 41. 
66. Knut Løyland & Vidar Ringstad, Fixed or Free Book Prices: Is a Hybrid System Superior?, 
INT’L J. CULTURAL POL’Y 238, 239 (2012).  
67. See Ley 10/2007, de 22 de junio, de la lectura, del libro y de las bibliotecas [Lectures, Books 
& Libraries Law] (B.O.E. 2007, 12351) (Spain), https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2007-
12351 [https://perma.cc/2QKL-2C7E]; Real Decreto 484/1990, de 30 de marzo, sobre precio de venta 
al público de libros [Book Publication Window Decree] (B.O.E. 1990, 9252) (Spain), https://www.boe.e 
s/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1990-9252 [https://perma.cc/8BL8-5M7R]. 
68. Batikas, supra note 61, at 28.  











contributing to the diversity of the literary market and fighting homogeneity 
in book supply.69 
Another commonly stated objective of RPM regimes is to offer a large 
number of sale points to readers. Having standard prices for the same title 
throughout the country supports the network of traditional booksellers and, 
in turn, contributes to the accessibility of books to the public.70 For example, 
Germany,71 France,72 Norway,73 Spain,74 and the Netherlands75 have all 
emphasized this objective as part of the stated goals of their RPM regime. 
In Portugal, due to various economic and organizational changes in the book 
market, bookstores were closing down; the Act aimed to correct this 
phenomenon and promote the revitalization of the book market, ensuring 
better conditions for all market players.76 
Yet another stated objective of such legislation is to support and 
encourage both the creation and consumption of books. For example, this 
has been one of the main objectives of the French Lang Law,77 the 
Norwegian law,78 and the modern Spanish 2007 Act of Reading, Books and 
Libraries.79  
RPM regimes also aim to prevent the sale of books for extremely low 
prices, reducing margins for both creators and producers. This has been one 
of the stated goals of the French Lang Law.80 In Greece, the 1997 fixed price 
book regime explicitly aimed to ensure revenue for publishers.81 It allows 
them to target small audiences and motivates them to publish unique, 
unprofitable titles, which, given the competition in a free market, would 
have otherwise been too risky to publish.82 Thus, the objective is strongly 
related to the diversity goal. 
 
69. OECD Roundtable 1997, supra note 27, at 60–61; Loi 81-766 du 10 août 1981 relative au 
prix du livre [Law 81-766 of August 10, 1981 Relating to Book Price], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Aug. 11, 1981, p. 2198, art. 1. (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affi 
chTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000517179 [https://perma.cc/NU7P-89JC].  
70. Id. 
71. RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 38. 
72. OECD Roundtable 1997, supra note 27, at 59–60. 
73. Løyland & Ringstad, supra note 66, at 239.  
74. Martos & Martos, supra note 60, at 142–43. 
75. RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 40. 
76. Decreto-Lei n.º 176/96, de 21 de Setembro, Diário da República 1996, 22 set. (Port.), https://d 
re.pt/pesquisa/-/search/215895/details/normal?p_p_auth=f1OAesSR [https://perma.cc/TS6H-W7K5]. 
77. OECD Roundtable 1997, supra note 27, at 59–60. 
78. Løyland & Ringstad, supra note 66, at 239–40.  
79. Ley 10/2007, de 22 de junio, de la lectura, del libro y de las bibliotecas [Lectures, Books & 
Libraries Law] (B.O.E. 2007, 12351) (Spain), https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2007-123 
51 [https://perma.cc/2QKL-2C7E]; Real Decreto 484/1990, de 30 de marzo, sobre precio de venta al 
público de libros [Book Publication Window Decree] (B.O.E. 1990, 9252) (Spain), https://www.boe.es/b 
uscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1990-9252 [https://perma.cc/8BL8-5M7R]. 
80. OECD Roundtable 1997, supra note 27, at 60. 













Other objectives, however, are raised by very few countries. The French 
Lang Law states that its objective is also to promote competition over 
professional services in book supply.83 Some countries, such as Norway, 
implement regimes with objectives that emphasize the state’s interest in 
strengthening local language and written culture.84 Norway also promotes 
the objective of encouraging competition between titles, book printing, and 
accessibility.85 Lastly, at least one country adopted RPM regimes to 
promote the objective of improving the protection of copyright.86 
Although not always clearly stated or explicitly explained, RPM 
arrangements may achieve all—or at least some of—these goals. Many of 
these goals are indeed reminiscent of the antitrust arguments supporting the 
legality of voluntary RPM arrangements. The analysis, which is 
traditionally the economic analysis, is quite similar. Indeed, in its positive 
economic sense, it is a clear competition law issue.  
D. RPM Arrangements in European and Other Countries’ Book Markets 
RPM arrangements are generally prohibited under the laws of 
competition in many countries, since they support price coordination 
between manufacturers and prevent price competition. In these countries, 
RPM arrangements are prohibited because they undermine the existence of 
a competitive market and, as a result, social efficiency and welfare. While 
there is a certain trend of change towards acceptance in relation to these 
arrangements, competition laws in many countries still prohibit or limit 
RPM arrangements.87 However, several countries have abolished their 
prohibitions by legislation.88 In particular, in book markets, RPM 
arrangements are allowed and sometimes even mandated.89 The regulatory 
 
83. OECD Roundtable 1997, supra note 27, at 61; Loi 81-766 du 10 août 1981 relative au prix 
du livre [Law 81-766 of August 10, 1981 Relating to Book Price], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Aug. 11, 1981, p. 2198 (Fr.); Austria followed the French model and its 
rationale in adopting modern legislation regulating the book market. HANREICH ET AL., supra note 21, 
at 33. 
84. Løyland & Ringstad, supra note 66, at 239; Bokavtalen à 1.1.2011 [The Book Agreement on 
January 1, 2011], BOKHANDLER FORENINGEN [BOOKSTORE ASSOCIATION] (Nor.), http://www.bokhandl 
erforeningen.no/bokavtalen-a-112011 [https://perma.cc/Q3RP-6YQ9]. 
85. Id.  
86. Id.  
87. For a detailed discussion of economic analysis of the RPM arrangement, see infra Part III.A 
Positive Analysis. 
88. See, e.g., Law 81-766 of August 10, 1981 (Fr.). 
89. In the past, RPM regimes were anchored in contracts between publishers and bookstores. 
Over time, various countries replaced these contractual arrangements with laws that included the RPM 
arrangement. The main difference between anchoring RPM arrangements by contract or legislation is 
the resulting regime’s application. A contractual agreement applies to those who join it; there is no duty 
to join the contractual agreement. A legislative resolution, on the other hand, applies to all—all 
 











arrangement of RPM in the book market is widespread throughout the 
European Union (“E.U.”) countries but very rare outside of the E.U.90 Out 
of twenty-eight E.U. countries, most adopted the RPM arrangement for 
book markets in one way or another. A few non-European counties have 
also adopted similar regimes.91  
RPM regulation in book markets is not uniform across all countries.92 
Not all books are necessarily subject to the RPM arrangement; some—such 
as textbooks, e-books, or reprints—may be exempt and therefore subject to 
free-market forces. Some regulatory arrangements include rules regarding 
discounts for certain periods (such as book fairs) or certain institutions (such 
as schools, libraries, or book clubs) or sales of large quantities. Usually, the 
arrangement is limited to a given period of time, after which the books will 
be traded in the free market. 
A few central regimes described below are illustrative of RPM 
arrangements. In Germany, the 2002 German Book Resale Price 
Maintenance Act (“BuchPrG”) provides price-setting of books by the 
publishers.93 A unique feature of the Act is that it covers cartographic 
products and even music sheets.94 In setting the price, publishers must 
consider the professional services offered by smaller booksellers and their 
contribution to the objective of supplying books on a broad basis.95 
Furthermore, publishers may not discriminate between traditional 
booksellers and non-traditional booksellers, such as supermarkets.96 Once 
the prices are set by the publishers, publishers, importers, and booksellers 
are bound to comply with them for eighteen months after the edition is 
released.97 The Act lists a number of specific exceptions to the rule, 
including the possibility to offer 5 to 10 percent discounts when selling 
books to schools and certain libraries, and for group sales.98 In order to be 
compatible with European competition law, the Act provides that it applies 
 
publishers and all bookstores (except for any exceptions in the law). See, e.g., RØNNING ET AL., supra 
note 28, at 18–19.  
90. See Marja Appelman, Fixed Book Price, in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 237, 
237 (Ruth Towse ed., 2003); STEPHANIE KURSCHUS, EUROPEAN BOOK CULTURES: DIVERSITY AS A 
CHALLENGE 262–71 (2015); RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28.  
91. RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 25–26.  
92. For details of RPM resolutions, see RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 30–71.  
93. Buchpreisbindungsgesetz [BuchPrG] [German Resale Price Maintenance Act], Sept. 2, 2002, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL I] at 3448, as amended by Gesetz [G], July 31, 2016, BGBL I at 
1937 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/buchprg/BJNR344810002.html [https://perma.cc/3AP 
G-T3NK], unofficial translation at http://www.berlinerbuchhandel.de/sixcms/media.php/976/German_ 
Resale_Price_Maintenance_Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2FX-2LW8] (Carol Wanske trans.). 
94. Id. § 2(1); see RØNNING ET AL., supra note 28, at 35.  
95. German Resale Price Maintenance Act § 6(1). 
96. Id. § 6(2); see also OECD Roundtable 2008, supra note 29, at 55. 
97. German Resale Price Maintenance Act §§ 3, 5, 8(1). 












only in Germany.99 Moreover, electronic books are within the scope of the 
RPM.100 
In France, the Lang Law requires publishers or importers of books to set 
retail prices. Retailers may charge between 95 and 100 percent of the set 
price and must provide free shipping for single copies.101 Importers of books 
published in France must charge an equal or higher price than the one set 
by the retailer.102 The law explicitly prevents the application of some 
elements of French competition policy regarding price-fixing.103 Finally, the 
law prohibits publishers from setting prices lower than the set price of the 
book’s first edition within nine months of the latter’s publication date.104 
The law also lists exceptions, providing that discounts of up to 9 percent 
may be provided when books are sold to state, municipal, and educational 
institutions, or to public libraries.105 There is also no price limit on 
schoolbooks that are sold by an association to its members.106 Notably, 
Austria107 and Greece108 have followed in the footsteps of the French Lang 
Law regime. 
 
99. Id. § 3.  
100. Id. § 2(1)3; Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN 
[BT] 18/8043 (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/18/080/1808043.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF42-HX 
WB]. 
101. Loi 81-766 du 10 août 1981 relative au prix du livre [Law 81-766 of August 10, 1981 
Relating to Book Price], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Aug. 11, 1981, p. 
2198, art. 1. (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000517179 
[https://perma.cc/NU7P-89JC]. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at art. 9; see also Ordonnance 45-1483 du 30 juin 1945 relative aux prix [Ordinance 45-
1483 of June 30, 1945 Relating to Price], J.O., July 8, 1945, p. 4150, art. 37 (Fr.), https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark 
:/12148/bpt6k9614744c/f1.item [https://perma.cc/6PMH-GLYW].  
104. Law 81-766 of August 10, 1981, art. 4 (Fr.). 
105. Id. at art. 3. 
106. Id. 
107. Austria adopted a new federal law on the price fixing of books in 2000. BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER 
DIE PREISBINDUNG BEI BÜCHERN [FEDERAL LAW ON PRICE MAINTENANCE FOR BOOKS] 
BUNDEGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] No. 45/2000, as amended (Austria), https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Geltend 
eFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20000789 [https://perma.cc/HN2G-WVJ 
H]; see ULRIKE SEHRSCHÖN & JOHANNES WILLHEIM, DAS NEUE BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE 
PREISBINDUNG BEI BÜCHERN: DARSTELLUNG DER NEUEN REGELUNG UND GESAMTTEXT DES GESETZES 
5 (2000) (Austria). It applies to the publication, importation, or trade of books and music in the German 
language as well as e-books, excluding textbooks and old books. Id. at 6. Importers and publishers must 
set a fixed minimum retail price for books published in Austria or imported into Germany, and retailers 
must maintain the set price accordingly. Id. at 9. It largely adopts the exceptions listed in the 
Sammelrevers and applies to cross-border online trade. Id. at 14; see also Martin Rätze, 
Buchpreisbindung in Österreich: Neue Regeln für Buch-Händler, SHOPBETREIBER-BLOG.DE (Nov. 18, 
2014) (Ger.), https://shopbetreiber-blog.de/2014/11/18/buchpreisbindung-ebooks-oesterreich/ [https://p 
erma.cc/N8KE-VMUL].  
108. Greece adopted a fixed price regime in 1997, which requires publishers to set a fixed price 
on books for a period of two years and allows booksellers to offer discounts of up to 10 percent of the 
fixed price. Nomos (1997:2557) Thesmoi, Metra kai Drosos Politistikes Anaptyxe [Institutions, 
Measures and Actions for Cultural Development] EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES 
DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 1997, A:271 (Greece); Batikas, supra note 61, at 25, 28.  











In Spain, the 2007 Act of Reading, Books and Libraries adopted a new 
model of an RPM regime. This legislation addressed modern liberalization 
trends in the book RPM regime, introducing a balanced mechanism that 
supports the mutual interests of the different players in the book market.109 
The regime of free discounts, which allegedly benefited consumers, was 
replaced with a balanced “free price” regime, which would appease both 
consumers and retailers.110 The Act endorses the liberalization introduced 
in previous decrees, recognizing nearly all of the special categories of 
books—including textbooks—that qualify for exemptions from price 
fixing.111  
In Portugal, the 1996 Fixed Book Price Law imposed a fixed price 
regime on books offered for sale to the public by publishers, printers, and 
importers.112 The fixed price of a copy must be visibly indicated by the 
retailer.113 Books may not be offered for sale for less than 90 percent of the 
fixed price during the first eighteen months from the date of publication or 
importation.114 Retailers may charge as low as 80 percent of the fixed price 
when books are purchased by either public or school libraries or other 
institutions that promote Portuguese literature.115 The same applies to 
special occasions or initiatives in which books are sold to promote this 
purpose, such as book fairs or exhibitions.116 The law explicitly exempts 
certain types of books from the fixed price regime such as school textbooks, 
limited high-quality editions, used books or books that are out of print, and 
more.117 The law went through revisions in 2000 and 2015 aimed at adapting 
it to modern economic and cultural changes, applying its provisions to 
electronic books, and improving its enforcement mechanisms in different 
ways.118  
 
109. See Ley 10/2007, de 22 de junio, de la lectura, del libro y de las bibliotecas [Lectures, Books 
& Libraries Law] (B.O.E. 2007, 12351) (Spain), https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2007-
12351 [https://perma.cc/2QKL-2C7E].  
110. Id.; see also Martos & Martos, supra note 60, at 142. 
111. Lectures, Books & Libraries Law art. 10–11. 
112. See Decreto-Lei n.º 176/96, de 21 de Setembro, art. 2, Diário da República 1996, 22 set. 
(Port.), https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/215895/details/normal?p_p_auth=f1OAesSR [https://perma.cc/ 
TS6H-W7K5]. 
113. Id. at art. 3. 
114. Id. at art. 4. 
115. Id. at art. 12. 
116. Id. at art. 14. 
117. Id. at art. 15. 
118. See Decreto-Lei n.º 196/2015, de 16 de Setembro, Diário da República 2015, 16 set. (Port.), 
https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/70309897/details/normal?q=196%2F2015 [https://perma.cc/ 














In the Netherlands, the Wet op de Vaste Boekenprijs (Fixed Book Price 
Law) came into force in 2005.119 The law provides that when a book written 
in Dutch or Frisian is published for the first time, the publisher must set a 
fixed price, which will be the price for all retailers.120 Exceptions to the fixed 
price apply to book clubs, bankrupt bookshops, and textbooks or other sales 
for school use.121 Publishers or booksellers may cancel the fixed price after 
one year of its application.122 Retailers are allowed to offer 5 to 10 percent 
discounts or even determine their own discounts in cases of selling multiple 
copies, depending on the number of copies and the identity of the buyer 
(libraries and educational institutions).123 They may also set a temporary (up 
to three months) “special price” for promotional purposes and even offer 
greater discounts of up to 20 percent for book clubs.124  
In the United Kingdom the RPM regime in the book industry, which was 
eventually abolished in 1995, was designed very differently.125 As we 
mentioned earlier, the Net Book Agreement (“NBA”) was a mechanism 
intended to administer individual RPM contracts and was not a collective 
price-fixing agreement between publishers and booksellers.126 Rather than 
imposing a formal RPM regime, it allowed publishers who were signatory 
members of the NBA to impose fixed prices, as long as they did so in 
compliance with its terms.127 The terms applied only to publishers or 
booksellers who wished to sell net books and were signatory members of 
the NBA, regardless of their membership in booksellers’ or publishers’ 
associations.128 The NBA did not apply to textbooks.129 The Joint 
Committee of the booksellers’ and publishers’ associations divided the book 
industry into sectors, providing each sector with different trade terms.130 
 
119. Wet van 9 november 2004 houdende regels omtrent de vaste boekenprijs (Wet op de vaste 
boekenprijs) [Law on Fixed Book Price], Stb. 2004, 600 (Neth.), https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen. 
nl/stb-2004-600.html [https://perma.cc/BMZ8-3JSC]; see also Houdijk, supra note 43, at 427. 
120. Law on Fixed Book Price art. 1 (Neth.); Houdijk, supra note 43, at 427. 
121. Law on Fixed Book Price art. 6(1)(b) (Neth.) (bankrupt bookshops); id. at art. 9 (book clubs); 
id. at art. 13 (textbooks); see also Houdijk, supra note 43, at 428.  
122. Law on Fixed Book Price art. 7 (Neth.). 
123. Besluit van 3 mei 2005, arts. 1–3, Stb. 2005, 269 (Neth.), https://zoek.officielebekendmaking 
en.nl/stb-2005-269.html [https://perma.cc/4U3S-T7N5]. 
124. Id. at arts. 7–9. 
125. See Dearnley, supra note 35, at 20–21. 
126. Id. However, see infra note 128. 
127. Dearnley, supra note 35, at 20–21. 
128. Id. at 20. It should be noted, however, that some see the NBA as a collective RPM 
arrangement as opposed to an individual one. See WALTER ALLAN & PETER CURWEN, COMPETITION 
AND CHOICE IN THE PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 22–24 (1991); OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, AN EVALUATION 
OF THE IMPACT UPON PRODUCTIVITY OF ENDING RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE ON BOOKS, 2008, OFT 
981, at 20 (U.K.), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110704142022/http://www.oft.gov.uk/ 
OFTwork/publications/publication-categories/reports/Evaluating/oft981 [https://perma.cc/2P2X-BRT 
S] (report prepared by the Centre for Competition Policy at University of East Anglia). 
129. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 128, at 43. 
130. Dearnley, supra note 35, at 50–52. 











Certain categories of sale were exempt from the NBA, including libraries 
and book clubs.131  
The Norwegian book market has also been regulated by industry 
agreements that were in place between 1998 and 2004.132 The price of books 
was determined annually by individual publishers and applied to members 
of the Norwegian Publishers’ Association and the Norwegian Bookshops 
Association.133 Under these agreements, the fixed price could be changed 
one year after the title or the new edition was released, and the period of the 
fixed price could also be extended.134 Discounts could be offered to public 
libraries and schools.135 These agreements were revised in 2005 and were 
extended through 2018.136 The Norwegian Competition Authority, 
however, opposed these agreements and viewed them as an imprecise tool 
for achieving their stated goals of promoting the availability, diversity, and 
quality of books.137 However, the agreements are still in place.138 
Table 1 below summarizes the major characteristics of a variety of RPM 
regimes in different European as well as other non-European countries. 
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131. Id. at 21. 
132. LASSE FRIDSTRØM ET AL., KONKURRANSETILSYNET [NORWEGIAN COMPETITION 
AUTHORITY], KVEN LYT SETJE PRIS PÅ BOKA?: EI VURDERING AV DEN NORSKE BOKMARKNADEN 10, 
12–13 (2004), https://docplayer.me/17014-Kven-lyt-setje-pris-pa-boka-ei-vurdering-av-den-norske-bo 
kmarknaden.html [https://perma.cc/L6YP-7CYH].  
133. Id. at 12.  
134. Id.  
135. Id. at 16. 
136. OECD Roundtable 2008, supra note 29, at 57; see also OECD, Annual Report on 
Competition Policy Developments in Norway – 2017, at 11, DAF/COMP/AR(2018)45 (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2018)45/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/72YQ-5LUB]; 
OECD, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Norway – 2014, at 5,  
DAF/COMP/AR(2014)27 (Dec. 9, 2014), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2014)27/en/ 
pdf [https://perma.cc/KSR2-F4MT] [hereinafter OECD Norway 2014].  
137. See OECD Norway 2014, supra note 136, at 5. 
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139. STEPHANIE KURSCHUS, EUROPEAN BOOK CULTURES: DIVERSITY AS A CHALLENGE 265 
(2015). 
140. Id. at 267. 
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141. Id. Applicable only to local books; imported books are outside of the resolution. 
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10 percent  2011 
United 
Kingdom No     1995 
Estonia No      
Finland No     1971 
Ireland No     1995144  
Latvia No      
Lithuania No      
Malta No      
Poland No      
Romania No      
Slovakia No      
Sweden No     1974 
E. Objections to Regulation  
RPM regimes in the book industry have been challenged on many 
grounds. The most important objection is rooted in competition and antitrust 
regulation. The relation of RPM regimes in the book industry to antitrust 
law is usually addressed explicitly by a specific legal exception from 
antitrust regulation for the book industry, suggesting that books are cultural 
assets and as such they should be treated differently from other goods. For 
example, German cartel law explicitly allowed RPM regimes in the book 
industry, subject to the registration and approval of the Federal Cartel 
 
143. The subject was re-discussed. See Mark Williams, Half of Belgium Gets Fixed-Price Book 
Law, TNPS (Oct. 23, 2017), https://thenewpublishingstandard.com/half-of-belgium-gets-fixed-price-bo 
ok-law/ [https://perma.cc/TLR6-AMZL]. 
144. The subject was re-discussed. See Frederick Van Der Ploeg, Beyond the Dogma of the Fixed 
Book Price Agreement, 28 J. CULTURAL. ECON. 1, 16 (2004). 











Office.145 In France, only minimum price regimes are banned by 
competition law, leaving a loophole for allowing recommended price 
regimes in the book sector.146 In the United Kingdom, the NBA was 
challenged as serving a publishers’ cartel, but it was protected by the courts 
on the grounds that “books are different.”147 In Switzerland, the competition 
authorities themselves justified the exemption of the book sector’s RPM 
arrangement on cultural policy grounds.148 The Swedish book industry was 
exempted from the prohibition on fixing prices based on recognition of its 
unique cultural value.149 Between 1998 and 2005, a Dutch booksellers’ 
organization, Koninklijke Boekverkopersbond (KVB), was granted a 
dispensation for maintaining its restrictive trade regulations.150 
However, a number of trends made it more difficult for European 
countries to maintain their RPM regimes based on cultural justifications 
alone. These trends include: the growing power of the competition 
authorities and related developments in national competition laws; the rise 
of the big production and retailing networks; and the accumulation of data 
regarding the effects of RPM regimes. Competition authorities, big 
networks, and scholars criticized the regimes for being incompatible with 
national competition law and for leading to higher book prices.151  
In the United Kingdom, following legislation that targeted all forms of 
RPM regimes and the establishment of the Office of Fair Trade in the 1970s, 
the NBA was constantly challenged.152 Dillons, a major bookselling 
network, criticized the NBA as responsible for the extensive rise in book 
prices during the 1980s.153 At the same time, the European Commission 
(“E.C.”) concluded that the NBA disrupted price competition within the 
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book trade, as booksellers who were not included in its lists suffered from 
competitive disadvantages.154  
The Spanish competition authorities accused the 1975 Book Law of 
hampering consumers’ welfare, suggesting that the restriction of price 
competition would inevitably lead to higher prices.155 The Portuguese RPM 
system was criticized for imposing tight regulation over discounting and 
consequently having a negative effect on potential readers.156  
The Dutch economists at the Competition Authority editorialized in a 
national newspaper that the Dutch RPM regime inevitably led to higher 
prices due to the restriction it posed to competition.157 The Swedish 
government abolished its RPM arrangement in 1970, finding it to be 
incompatible with national competition legislation and involve 
unnecessarily high prices.158 Greek scholars accused their country’s regime 
of allowing retailers and publishers to maintain high prices and making no 
adjustments due to the sharp decrease in household income following the 
Greek recession.159 
Because most countries that have adopted book RPM regimes belong to 
the E.U., such regimes also raise anticompetitive concerns under E.U. 
competition policy because they affect trade between E.U. member states 
and distort competition. The E.U. also monitors the inner trade within 
member states, although it has no jurisdiction over national competition 
policy. Furthermore, it recognizes that the cultural value of books at the E.U. 
level may sometimes prevail over competition principles. Although the E.U. 
rarely intervenes in this respect, member states face uncertainty regarding 
their RPM regimes, and some of them have chosen to adopt or adapt to E.U. 
competition principles. Many European countries addressed these concerns 
through securing their RPM arrangement in legislation while adjusting its 
provisions in order to comply with the E.U.’s policy. For example, the 
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European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) struck down the German-Austrian 
collective RPM agreements (Sammelrevers), finding them incompatible 
with its competition policy.160 In response, the two countries amended their 
RPM laws to secure their regimes.161 In compliance with the E.U.’s policy, 
the German Act exempted cross-border sales from its RPM regime.162 In an 
attempt to comply with E.U. policy, the French Lang Law provisions that 
regulate imported books do not apply to the importations of books originally 
published by a member state.163 The British Publishers’ Association ended 
the application of the NBA in Ireland due to concerns regarding the E.C.’s 
1988 decision, which found that the NBA was incompatible with E.U. 
competition law.164 In this respect, the E.C. could not find the NBA 
restrictions indispensable for accomplishing public interests, and thus, they 
did not qualify for an exemption.165 However, the NBA was not ruled 
illegal, and in 1995, the E.C.J. accepted the claims of the Publishers’ 
Association, annulling its former decision.166 The Dutch RPM legislation, 
which was enacted in response to E.U. bans on vertical restraints, states in 
its provisions that it does not violate E.U. competition policy since it may 
be justified under cultural policy.167 
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Finally, RPM regimes in book markets are widely criticized for not 
fulfilling their intended major objectives, namely the increased diversity and 
availability of books and the increased competition in services offered by 
retailers. These arguments rely on the experience with the RPM regime and 
its effects in the country in question as well as the comparative experience 
with other European countries. Sometimes, positive effects are attributed to 
different factors than the RPM arrangement, and many times it cannot be 
determined if the effect in question is linked to the RPM regime or not. The 
discussion that follows describes these objections in greater detail. 
One of the primary arguments in favor of a single price is its ability to 
maximize certainty for booksellers, who would be willing to take the risk 
and diversify their selection of books (“cross-subsidization”) instead of 
selling popular books on discount (best-sellerization or “cream skimming”), 
since less popular books would be sold for a full price.168 However, the 
experience in countries where no RPM regime is imposed shows 
booksellers flourishing and offering a variety of titles.169 Frederick Van Der 
Ploeg showed that this argument in support of a single price is incorrect in 
the case of the book market, as textbooks and guidebooks feature a 
substantial price elasticity and cannot be regarded as highly profitable, 
while the so-called “high-quality” titles tend to have lower price elasticity 
and thus would incur higher costs.170 Additionally, the RPM arrangement 
does not guarantee that booksellers would use the extra profits to enrich 
their assortment, as they may invest these profits primarily in ordering the 
more profitable titles.171  
Furthermore, since the publishers set the price, they may deliberately 
increase retail profit margins to promote specific titles while lowering 
margins for other titles, thus incentivizing retailers to step up their 
promotion of the more profitable titles.172 Even if the RPM arrangement 
promotes a larger selection of books, these are generally not bestsellers and 
may take time to sell. This will lead to difficulties in managing stocks 
efficiently and possibly increased management costs.173 
In addition, the idea that the rise of the big chains and supermarkets as a 
result of unregulated competition would have an adverse effect on diversity 
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or quality is implausible, since such entities have no interest in narrowing 
their selection of titles and leaving the demand for quality books 
unsatisfied.174 
Perona and Pouvet criticize the length of the RPM period in the Lang 
Law (two years), which does not allow retailers to adjust prices in ways that 
will attract readers and help promote the dissemination of new titles.175 
Moreover, online trade and reading platforms make books available to the 
public like never before, and questions of geographic accessibility or 
diversity seem irrelevant and outdated.176 
Many objections have also been raised with regard to the pricing effects 
on diversity with regards to RPM arrangements in different countries. 
Critics of the Portuguese RPM regime argue that the prevention of 
discounts, considering the already high prices of books in the country, 
impairs consumers’ purchasing power, encouraging them to buy cheaper 
foreign books instead of promoting Portuguese literature, which eventually 
shrinks the market and decreases the level of diversity.177 The Austrian Act 
was criticized for allowing booksellers, especially the big retailers, to raise 
prices significantly despite consumers’ and small bookstores’ interests.178 
An OECD report on the Dutch RPM regime found no rationale in 
maintaining it, noting that, relying on the experience of free price regimes, 
there is no evidence suggesting a decline in the number of books, yet there 
is evidence that book prices are higher under RPM regulation.179 A 2013 
report commissioned by several Dutch Ministries found that the Dutch RPM 
regime did not lead to an increase in book sales, except in children’s books, 
and, in terms of diversity, the number of genres and titles per genre available 
for sale were decreasing (in both physical and online outlets).180 The 
Swedish Competition Authority, which abolished the country’s RPM 
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arrangement, regarded the regime as preserving an ineffective market 
structure and as detrimental to the production of books.181  
Some objections have also been raised with regards to the possible 
effects on services’ competition. A major argument in favor of RPM 
regimes speaks of encouraging competition in services offered by retailers 
(expert’s advice, home delivery, etc.), yet Appelman notes that the existence 
of such platforms over the internet or in newspapers renders these services 
irrelevant.182 Moreover, the Spanish Competition Authority concludes that 
services’ competition exists regardless of fixed price mechanisms and that 
in this case, it “does not necessarily lead to an increase in demand for 
books.”183 The Authority further notes that the RPM arrangement slows 
down the development of modernized channels of distribution, and thus, it 
does not promote accessibility.184  
In summary, many objections have been raised regarding RPM 
arrangements, chief among them is their anticompetitive effects; their 
failure to fulfill the goals of diversity and availability of books; and their 
failure to increase competition in services offered by retailers. The 
discussion that follows turns to what effects these arrangements actually had 
under different countries’ RPM regimes. 
F. Effects of Arrangements 
There is a large body of empirical data pertaining to the effects of RPM 
arrangement and free market competition in the book sector. Below we 
survey what is known about these arrangements, specifically touching upon 
their competitive effects, including their impact on book prices and the 
number of titles produced, their impact on diversity, their impact on the 
number of booksellers, including online sellers, and their impact on 
competition in services.  
Generally, the discussion shows unclear and inconclusive effects, 
especially when one compares different RPM arrangements’ effects to free 
market competition models’ effects. We will examine what is known about 
the effects of RPM regimes primarily in Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland, while also considering what is known about free 
competition in the book market, mainly in the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
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1. Effects on Pricing and Number of Titles 
Exploring the competitive effects of RPM regimes and their impact on 
prices and the number of titles published uncovers a complex picture. 
Evidence from Germany suggests that the new RPM regime did not slow 
down competition in the German book market.185 In Germany, roughly 
ninety thousand new titles are published every year, and the average book 
price in Germany is among the lowest in Europe, excluding Finland and 
Iceland.186 Rønning presents similar data in her report on European RPM; 
while the German book trade is flourishing, showing stable figures in sales 
and title production between 2001 and 2009 and in more recent years, 
traditional booksellers are in decline.187 In 2015, Jessica Sänger, Legal 
Counsel and Deputy Head of the Legal Department at the German 
Publishers and Booksellers Association (the Börsenverein), suggested that 
while price competition is eliminated, the German book market incentivizes 
competition in services such as delivery, quality, and advice, leading to 
cross-subsidization, thus contributing to a large selection of titles.188  
The French Lang Law contains an evaluation procedure, which instructs 
the government to submit to the parliament a report evaluating the law’s 
implementation.189 Perona and Pouvet point out that this provision 
effectively was a dead letter, as the evaluation conducted in 1987 and 1988 
did not draw concrete conclusions.190 However, a 1997 analysis of the book 
market since the Lang Law came into effect in 1981 suggested that the 
number of published titles had increased overall. In ten years, the number 
rose from 25,602 in 1981 to 39,342 in 1991.191 The number of sold copies 
also increased slightly from 345,923 in 1981 to 476,125 in 1991.192 The 
market shares of traditional booksellers have been eroding slowly since the 
law’s adoption but remain above 65 percent.193  
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According to the French Coalition for Cultural Diversity, the effects of 
the Lang Law are generally positive as of 2008.194 The figures show a rich 
selection of books available for customers—450,000 titles in total, while 
65,000 new titles are published in the country every year.195 There was also 
no evidence that there was an inflation in book prices; in fact, prices were 
lower than the general consumer price index.196 In 2013, the French 
Publishers Association, Syndicat National de l’Edition (“SNE”), also 
showed that the Lang Law allegedly led to the elimination of the “best-
sellerization” phenomenon, as the top ten bestsellers in France represent 
merely 2.5 percent of the market share, while in the United Kingdom they 
comprise more than 15 percent of total sales.197 
In the Netherlands, where a new Fixed Book Price Law was enacted in 
2005, the Act itself provides for an evaluation scheme, under which 
submission of an evaluation report is required every four years.198 These 
evaluations show that since the Act’s introduction, bookstores offer a 
variety of titles, especially in the fiction genre, and the availability of overall 
titles, and fiction titles in particular, has been stable.199 Rønning notes that 
while overall sales have increased since the Act, sales of academic and 
scholarly titles, as well as their availability, have decreased, though due to 
reasons other than the effects of the price-fixing regime.200 The 2009 
evaluation suggests that the Act has successfully fulfilled the cultural 
purposes of promoting books’ availability and accessibility.201 Rønning 
explains that no significant changes have taken place, mainly because the 
Act continues the previous trade regulation regime.202 The 2013 evaluation 
report concludes that the irreversible digitization of bookselling, which is 
the most significant trend within the industry, renders the Act less and less 
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relevant, as availability is achieved far more by online book sales than by 
increasing the number of physical bookshops.203 After the issuance of this 
last evaluation, government officials made public remarks in favor of the 
Act, viewing it as an essential protection for vulnerable authors, such as new 
authors.204 However, the Dutch Consumers Authority (“ACM”) has 
criticized the Act as “old-fashioned and ineffective,” since there is no 
evidence that it promotes diversity by incentivizing retailers to offer 
unpopular titles.205 The Council of Culture published a detailed response to 
the 2013 evaluation, weighing the Act’s benefits and shortcomings, and 
suggesting that it should not be abolished and that more research on its 
impact is needed.206  
In Switzerland, when the Sammelrevers were abolished in 2007, the 
Swiss Parliament launched an initiative to develop a fixed price regime act 
modeled after the French, German, and Austrian book fixed price laws.207 
To this end, the Parliament assigned a research team to assess the effects 
that the free price regime had on book prices in the country.208 The team 
conducted thorough research, collecting two comparable data sets: one 
while the Sammelrevers were still in place and the other after they were 
abolished.209 The team concluded that an informed consumer would be able 
to save a significant amount of money when buying books after the abolition 
of the Sammelrevers, whereas prior to their abolition, prices for an average 
title in Switzerland were 15 percent higher compared to its German 
counterpart.210 However, one of the factors leading to the enactment of a 
Swiss book law was the rapid rise in book prices under the free price 
regime.211 In fact, the Swiss publishers and booksellers abused their position 
in the local market, so that French books offered for sale in Switzerland 
were significantly more expensive than the same books in France (under the 
French fixed-price regime).212 In 2008, Swiss titles were on average 6 to 13 
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percent more expensive than the same titles in Germany.213 The Swiss book 
law was rejected by voters in a referendum in 2012.214 
Exploring the effects in the United Kingdom and Sweden is also 
important because these two countries transitioned from an RPM regime 
into a free trade system, allowing a comparison of these transitions’ effects 
on competition. 
Studying the effects of the Net Book Agreement in the United Kingdom 
is important. The NBA was in effect from 1899 until 1997, when it was 
declared illegal.215 An analysis conducted by the University of East Anglia 
in 2008 suggests that the suspension of the NBA in 1995 possibly led to an 
upward surge in labor productivity.216 Nevertheless, while such an increase 
in productivity was recorded between 1994 and 1996 when the NBA was 
suspended voluntarily, a decline in productivity was reported after its formal 
abolition in 1997.217 Between 1999 and 2005, the vast majority of British 
booksellers, including the big chains, suffered significant productivity 
losses.218 The decline may be attributed to the emergence of alternative 
booksellers, such as supermarkets, books clubs, and online retailers such as 
Amazon.219 In an attempt to test the implications of suspending the book 
RPM mechanism, the report drew comparisons between the United 
Kingdom and Germany, which maintained and enforced its RPM regime.220 
Figures from 2000 to 2006 show a significant growth in the publishing of 
British titles compared to all other European countries, including Germany 
(in which rates were also higher than the average within the E.U.).221 In 
terms of prices, figures show a rapid increase in the United Kingdom, while 
in Germany prices have increased at a slower pace.222 
Fishwick’s analysis, which was also published in 2008, presents similar 
conclusions regarding the increase in prices.223 Following the abolition of 
the NBA and the emergence of both supermarkets and online networks such 
as Amazon as dominant book retailers, discounts had become more 
extensive and offered for nearly all titles available for sale.224 As a result, 
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small booksellers could not compete with the big retailers or the new 
players.225 However, since 2004, this trend has been balanced as small 
bookshops were able to offer personal services and diverse titles, 
maintaining a status of “niche” bookshops while the supermarkets offered 
mainly bestsellers.226 While competition led to extensive discounting, 
publishers attempted to compensate by raising the recommended resale 
prices.227 Fishwick’s findings refute the popular assumption that RPM 
regimes result in higher prices because after Britain removed the NBA book 
prices did not fall, but increased.228 This prompts defenders of RPM 
arrangements to accept the inefficiency of this mechanism while justifying 
it merely on cultural values.229 The analysis of the British book industry 
following the suspension of the NBA proves otherwise, as prices have been 
rising since then despite market competition.230 In an earlier study by 
Fishwick, he concluded that while predictions of higher prices, fewer new 
titles, and smaller stocks following the demise of the NBA proved generally 
accurate, sales in the book industry are fairly high due to aggressive pricing 
and significant efficiency in distribution by Amazon and the 
supermarkets.231 Publishers face a more concentrated market, which 
involves a leap in buyer’s bargaining power and leads to smaller profits for 
some.232 However, the emergence of the alternative retailers in the market 
led to its expansion, which means that publishers would significantly benefit 
from bestsellers or books with high demand while some of those who 
publish niche titles might lose overall.233 Finally, from the consumers’ 
perspective, due to the ability to freely discount books, bestsellers are now 
significantly cheaper than their price under the NBA.234 On the other hand, 
readers who enjoy less popular genres or titles would undoubtedly pay more 
for these than they would under the NBA, since price competition leaves no 
incentive for booksellers to subsidize less popular books with profits from 
bestsellers.235 
Very much like the United Kingdom, Sweden has also transitioned into 
a free trade system in the book industry. Trade agreements in the book sector 
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expired in the early 1990s.236 Following the abandonment of the central 
trade agreements, the book industry turned to signing ad-hoc agreements in 
different constellations.237 This liberalization of the book market entailed a 
differentiation between publishers.238 Whereas the larger and more powerful 
publishers could enjoy higher rates of exposure, the smaller publishers 
struggled to find sales opportunities to the point where placing large orders 
became a prerequisite for publishing.239 Furthermore, consumers gained 
more control over the titles offered for sale in bookstores, and as a result, 
titles bearing an unclear commercial potential were less likely to be offered 
at all.240 Nevertheless, bookstores have survived these changes.241 Books 
have been made available in a variety of different places and through many 
more channels than before, such as book clubs, supermarkets, petrol 
stations, and more.242 Additionally, book clubs and online sales platforms 
became more dominant compared to traditional bookstores.243 Nevertheless, 
the report of the Swedish Booksellers Association and the Swedish 
Publishers Association also finds some positive outcomes following the 
transition.244 For example, the number of titles published in Sweden rose 
steadily since the 1990s.245 However, this trend stagnated in the mid-2000s, 
and, since 2008, the number of titles has been in decline.246 Another positive 
aspect of price competition is that the free price system did not lead to higher 
prices in all genres, and the average price of books did not reach the inflation 
rate of the 1970s.247 While the prices of textbooks, educational literature, 
and non-fiction books increased during this period, the price of children’s 
books actually decreased.248 In fact, since the 1990s, the average book price 
has dropped and is considered one of the lowest among European 
countries.249 Price competition over the internet also contributes to the wide 
range of prices for the same title.250 Rønning et al., for instance, conclude in 
their analysis that drastic changes in the book markets, especially recent 
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technological developments such as online sales and the introduction of 
electronic books, will pave the way for a new business culture in the book 
market, regardless of a fixed price or a free price system.251 
The 1997 OECD Competition Committee Roundtable evaluated the 
Swedish book market.252 The report concludes that “it would seem that the 
pessimistic predictions of publishers and retailers about the detrimental 
effects of allowing price competition have not been realised.”253 The report 
also found that a number of bookstores did close down as a result of the 
transition to the free price system and noted some changes in the market 
structure, mostly in terms of types of book distribution.254 These changes in 
market structure involved the growing market shares of mail-order 
companies, primarily book clubs and department stores.255 The report found 
that the number of specialized bookstores had increased significantly.256 
Thus, for Sweden, it seems that the transition away from the RPM regime 
proved successful in terms of accessibility.257 
In Spain, no studies were conducted on the Spanish book sector, except 
for the textbook sector.258 In a 2001 study, it was found that the 
liberalization in the textbook sector, which was excluded from the price 
fixing regime, did not yield any positive results, apparently since small 
bookshops were in an inferior position compared with the big chains.259  
Studying other European markets, it is hard to tell if book RPM systems 
or their absence necessarily lead to higher prices.260 Because prices 
increased both in countries that adopted RPM regimes and in countries 
lacking such a regime, it is argued that book RPM regimes do not have a 
significant impact on prices, and the evolution of the market in this respect 
is attributed to the sensitivity of consumers towards prices.261 There is no 
sufficient data on the elasticity of book prices and their effects on 
demand.262 Perona and Pouvet conclude that RPM arrangements’ effects on 
the book market are ambiguous and difficult to ascertain.263 Other studies 
show that in 1999 the number of titles per 10,000 residents was higher on 
average in countries where book RPM regimes were not implemented, 
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compared to countries where they were, with significant variations between 
different countries.264 This suggests that the RPM regime in itself is not 
necessarily a decisive factor in this respect.265  
2. Effects on Diversity 
Studying the effects on diversity also uncovers different results. In 2013, 
the French Publisher’s Association, SNE, noted that the Lang Law has been 
adopted as a model in at least fifteen countries and is being debated around 
the world following the decline in the number of bookshops.266 Addressing 
the implications of the law, SNE argued that it fulfilled both cultural 
diversity and the stabilization of the book market, playing a significant role 
in enhancing accessibility to readers and booksellers.267 Perona and Pouvet 
also note that while the Lang Law apparently allows the survival of 
independent booksellers, it hampers the deployment of large networks that 
would have offered large selections, thus negatively affecting the 
achievement of diversity and accessibility.268 
In the Netherlands, the 2009 evaluation report on the question of 
diversity suggested that the number of titles of different genres sold between 
2005 and 2008 had slightly increased, and authors of the report concluded 
that the Act has therefore contributed to this trend.269 However, the 2013 
evaluation of the Dutch Act provided a different picture.270 There, the 
number of genres and the number of titles per genre available for sale—both 
in physical and online outlets—were decreasing, negatively affecting 
diversity.271 Overall, diversity has slightly improved since the introduction 
of the Act, as the share of bookshops offering a wide selection of books 
between 2006 and 2012 remained stable.272 However, since 2008, the 
number of genres and “unique” titles offered for sale is decreasing.273 
In Sweden, the data paints a grim picture regarding the diversity of titles 
offered in bookstores.274 Under the free price system, booksellers ceased to 
accommodate a wide selection of books and instead featured the more 
commercially profitable titles on their shelves.275 
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3. Effects on the Number of Booksellers and Online Stores 
RPM regimes have had different impacts on the number of booksellers 
and the flourishing of online trade in books. In Germany, as of 2010, the 
online book market for used books was growing.276 Traditional booksellers 
were in decline and held only 50 percent of the market share. At the same 
time, internet sales were rapidly rising: direct online sales were 18 percent 
of total book sales, and another nearly 14 percent of sales were made 
through online bookshops in 2010.277 The Legal Counsel to the 
Börsenverein suggested in 2015 that while the market share of e-books was 
growing, it stood at less than 5 percent. She further explained that small 
booksellers offering printed books held 50 percent of the market and were 
still “stabl[e].”278 
In France, the number of publishing houses remained stable between 
1981 and 1990, and it is argued that the legislation contributed to the 
maintenance of a large number of publishers.279 The French Coalition for 
Cultural Diversity has argued that the Lang Law’s purpose of preserving the 
network of small booksellers has been fulfilled because 3,000 professional 
bookshops comprise 40 percent of the distribution of books in certain 
sectors in the country.280 The SNE also notes that the figures point to a 
remarkable number of 2,500 independent booksellers that represent nearly 
50 percent of the market, suggesting that the law has successfully prevented 
booksellers from closing down.281 As a comparison, in the United Kingdom, 
where book RPM was abolished, a third of independent bookshops closed 
down in the past decade, and they represent only 4 percent of the British 
book industry.282 
In the Netherlands, in terms of promoting availability, the 2009 
evaluation report found that the number of physical outlets had been 
maintained, though most sales were performed online.283 However, the 
supply offered by those bookshops had been decreasing since 2000, and it 
was difficult to say if this effect stemmed from the Act or not.284 The 2013 
report suggested that the number of online retailers was growing while the 
number of physical outlets remained stable.285 However, the share of 
physical outlets offering a large number of “unique” titles remained stable, 
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unlike in the previous evaluation, which suggested a decline in this 
respect.286 
In Switzerland, E.C. reports showed a decline in points of sale following 
the adoption of the free price regime in Switzerland.287  
In the United Kingdom, another trend pointed to a rapid decline in small 
bookshops in the United Kingdom following the transition away from the 
NBA agreements and to a free trade system in the book market.288 When 
compared to Germany, which developed online book markets at nearly the 
same time in 1998, growth in market share of online book retailers in the 
United Kingdom is far more substantial and rapidly growing.289  
In Sweden, statistics introduced by Rønning in a 2012 report to the 
Norwegian government showed a clear decline in the number of sales 
outlets among Swedish booksellers who were members of the Bookstores 
Association following the introduction of the free price system.290 This data 
possibly suggested a negative trend in terms of accessibility.291 The 1997 
OECD Competition Committee Roundtable evaluated the Swedish book 
market after the transition to the free price system and found that some 
bookstores had closed and noted some changes in the market structure.292 
These changes in market structure involved the growing market shares of 
mail-order companies, primarily book clubs and department stores.293 The 
report found that the number of specialized bookstores had increased 
significantly.294 Thus, for Sweden, it seems that the transition away from the 
RPM regime proved successful in terms of accessibility.295 
4. Effects on Services’ Competition 
Unlike other effects of RPM regimes, there is very little empirical data 
on the effects of RPM arrangements on competition regarding services. In 
Germany, in 2015, the Legal Counsel for the Börsenverein suggested that 
while price competition was eliminated, the German book market 
incentivized competition in services such as delivery, quality, and advice.296  
In summary, the transitions in the book industry are hard to predict. The 
experience gathered from different European countries about the 
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effectiveness of fixed price regimes is contradictory. Thus, it is difficult to 
assess the effects of such regimes on diversity and availability, as well as 
on the other goals RPM regimes try to accomplish. Adding the technological 
changes that have occurred and the flourishing of online trade generally and 
online trade in books specifically, the assessment of these regimes’ 
effectiveness becomes even more complex. 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF BOOK MARKETS 
Book markets consist of several layers.297 The first layer is content, in 
which writers work. The second layer is publishing, which includes the 
production of the books (such as translation, editing, illustration, and 
design) and usually their marketing and distribution. The third layer is retail, 
which includes bookstores and other stores—whether physical or online—
that also sell books.  
Economically, there are no conspicuous failures in typical book markets. 
Basically, a book is a private good. A book is also an experience good, the 
quality of which is learned through consumption. Today, however, there is 
copious information for book consumers about the quality of books, so the 
cost of experience is not high.  
Anyone can write a book if she wishes, and there are no special barriers 
to entry for producers along the chain of production of books—from writers 
to publishers to bookstores. There is, however, considerable uncertainty 
about the success of the products—new books.298 Content production of 
books entails several risks: the risk that the book will not get printed; the 
risk that it will not be marketed by the publisher; the risk of it not being 
successful even after marketing; and, the risk of a low profit even if it is 
successful. However, uncertainty in itself is not usually a failure that needs 
to be addressed in a regulatory manner. Rather, there are market measures 
(such as contracts) to address uncertainty. For example, publishers try to 
reduce uncertainty by diversifying which books they publish.299  
However, the typical production process of books bears high fixed costs 
(independent of the number of readers) and very low variable costs 
(depending on the number of copies sold) that will continue to decrease with 
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the development of technology in the production and marketing of books.300 
There is a possibility for specialization, expressed in different genres of 
books (for instance, children’s books, cookbooks, science fiction, poetry 
books, and history books). However, there is competition between books, at 
least in the same genre.301 If different books—even those of the same 
genre—are not sufficiently interchangeable, the appropriate analytical 
framework would be of a monopolistic competition.302  
In addition, the profitable life of a new mass-marketed book is relatively 
short.303 One of the unique characteristics of books is that a large part of the 
cost of a book is expressed in the time spent reading it. The more time it 
takes reading a book, and the larger the value of time, the lower book 
consumption sensitivity is to its market price (i.e., the elasticity of demand 
for books is low). 
Although a book is basically a private good, it might have additional 
properties of a public good.304 These characteristics are also expressed in 
the claim that books, unlike other goods, are cultural goods. The existence 
of books may offer an option value for their future consumption; a value 
may also stem from the mere knowledge of their existence, apart from their 
actual consumption. Books can create cultural values like national identity, 
national pride, solidarity, heritage, and more.305 
Generally, book markets in many countries do not suffer from lack of 
competition. Book prices per se do not necessarily indicate anything, and 
they have also changed over time without a clear trend, although in recent 
years, there has been a decline in book prices.306 Household expenditures on 
books is on the rise in nominal as well as in real terms.307  
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III. RPM ARRANGEMENTS: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Before we turn to the analysis of the special regulatory RPM 
arrangement for the book market, we will discuss the significance and 
expected results of RPM arrangements in general. The economic analysis 
of RPM arrangements is mainly done within the framework of “industrial 
organization.”308 The basic economic analysis indicates that RPM 
arrangements prevent price competition between stores at the retail level 
and support coordination among manufacturers (cartelization) that reduces 
competitive pressures.309 These two effects adversely affect efficiency and 
therefore affect social welfare.  
The basic approach to RPM arrangements among economists and 
regulatory authorities (e.g., the Federal Trade Commission) is one of 
negativity or at least suspicion.310 Accordingly, competition laws in many 
countries prohibit or limit RPM arrangements. Most of these countries 
include sweeping prohibitions (per se illegality) explicitly or impliedly. 
Nevertheless, legal frameworks change, and there is a trend away from 
sweeping prohibitions towards more decisional flexibility and case-by-case 
analysis—e.g., a rule of reason.311 While outside the United States flexibility 
in evaluating RPM arrangements is grounded in a default presumption of 
illegality, in the United States the tide has turned. Over three decades, 
starting with GTE Sylvania and culminating with Leegin,312 the United 
States Supreme Court has gradually moved from applying a per se illegality 
rule in vertical restraints cases to a rule of reason.313 
Still, the general approach of economists and jurists in the field of 
competition law in relation to RPM arrangements is not a positive one. 
Antitrust authorities in many countries, including the United States, oppose 
these arrangements in the markets, including in book markets.314  
The reason for the apparent legal change is a growing recognition among 
economists that RPM arrangements may have some efficiency-based 
advantages.315 A prominent example is the lack of incentives for stores 
selling the same product to invest in sale-related services, such as consumer 
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guidance, experienced staff, or well-stocked inventory.316 Investment in 
sales efforts hurts retailer profits if it cannot be accompanied by a price 
raise. A rise in price would hurt sales and, therefore, profits, since it would 
then be possible to purchase the product for a lower price at another store 
that did not provide these services. In other words, it is a free-riding 
problem, whereby no retailer engages in non-price competition that is 
beneficial to consumers in general (that is, consumers are willing to pay for 
their value).317 The RPM arrangement can address free riding incentives by 
eliminating intrabrand price competition and thus making competition over 
other components, such as services, possible.  
Academic literature challenges this explanation.318 First, even in a 
competitive market, there is an incentive for manufacturers or retailers to 
compete over limited demand by providing services.319 Second, even if sales 
effort incentives in a competitive market are insufficient, and an RPM 
arrangement may provide such incentives, it is impossible to know whether 
resulting incentives are excessive or lacking.320 In particular, RPM 
arrangements may over-incentivize provision of ancillary services in the 
sense that the manufacturers’ or retailers’ supply costs are greater than the 
benefit they provide to consumers. 
The following discussion focuses on RPM arrangements in book 
markets. Their positive effects in book markets are first presented, followed 
by their normative analysis, which is the core issue of this study. 
A. Positive Analysis 
RPM arrangements in various European countries’ book markets 
emphasize two main goals: (1) increasing public access to books;321 and (2) 
increasing the diversity of books offered in the market.322 The economic 
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literature on RPM arrangements also emphasizes these two goals as central 
components of public policy in the field of books.323  
Starting with access, several important variables influence the 
accessibility of books. The first is book prices. Lower book prices increase 
book consumption. A second variable is the degree of bookstores’ proximity 
to consumers. Dispersed selling points of books affect the costs involved in 
reaching bookstores and thus consuming books overall. Hence, public 
policy in the field of books also focuses on the proliferation of bookstores 
and their spatial distribution. A third variable may be related book retail 
services, such as training or consulting, or maintaining inventories, which 
may improve accessibility for consumers. 
The diversity component, which is explicitly stated in the goals of many 
European countries’ laws, is more difficult to characterize and define than 
the accessibility component. Generally, there is value in providing a 
thorough response to the various needs and preferences of individuals in 
society. Although the number of titles advertised indirectly indicates 
diversity, it is certainly not a good measure of diversity. The degree of book 
markets’ diversity should be assessed by the extent to which the diverse 
needs and preferences of individuals are met. An indirect measure may be 
the degree of differentiation among published books. However, the 
definition of such an index, and especially its measurement in practice, is 
quite complicated.324 We should add that the variety of books held in 
bookstores’ inventories is another variable—a mixed one—that affects both 
accessibility and diversity. It is insufficient to disperse bookstores if their 
stock does not meet the variety of consumer needs. 
The regulatory arrangement of RPM limits competition in book markets. 
The ability to set a uniform price for consumers in all bookstores enables 
collaboration between publishers and bookstores or chain stores in setting 
the consumer price to maximize their profits. Needless to say, the lack of 
intrabrand competition under a uniform price arrangement gives 
monopolistic power to publishers and distributers, as well as to bookstores. 
A monopoly power allows book prices to rise above competitive market 
prices (and the consumed quantity to fall), and accordingly, increase 
publishers’ and bookstores’ profits.325 Monopolistic power is limited by 
demand elasticity and by interbrand competition. The larger demand 
elasticity is for books (i.e., increased consumer sensitivity to book prices), 
the harder it is to raise prices. The elasticity of demand for books depends, 
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among other things, on the existence of “close” substitutes for books, such 
as films, games, performances, and other books.326 It is also affected by the 
cost of consuming books, which is the time required to read books. Higher 
value of (book-reading) time lowers the sensitivity of consumers to books’ 
market prices, and therefore lowers the demand elasticity in book markets. 
We should, therefore, expect a non-trivial price increase for books that are 
protected by RPM regimes. 
The monopolistic gains made possible by RPM arrangements also hurt 
incentives to increase the profitability of existing books, as well as 
incentives to create innovation and improve profitability in the selection of 
new books for publication.327 Moreover, the potential for monopoly power 
under RPM arrangements encourages investment in political activities to 
acquire such power—i.e., rent-seeking.328 The very existence of a 
manufacturers’ lobby in various countries’ book markets to support these 
laws raises a suspicion that public policy is dictated by the industry 
preferences rather than the public interest. These are non-profit 
organizations or associations that serve for-profit entities. Thus, for 
example, arguments rooted in a culture-based ideology must be 
questioned.329  
However, it is important to emphasize the benefits of RPM 
arrangements. First, a larger variety of books is expected, in comparison to 
unconstrained competitive conditions.330 As mentioned above, the typical 
production process of books is subject to large fixed costs (independent of 
the number of readers) and low variable costs (which depend on the number 
of printed books), with the latter further decreasing with technological 
development in the production and marketing of books. When fixed 
production costs are high, unconstrained competition does not necessarily 
result in an optimal outcome. Publishers and distributors must sell a 
sufficient quantity of books to cover their fixed costs. Thus, books that are 
not expected to be sold in sufficiently large quantities will not be produced 
 
326. Indeed, extensive interbrand competition slashes monopoly power. 
327. See Appelman, supra note 90, at 238–39. 
328. See Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575 (1982); Gordon Tullock, 
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 224–32 (1967). 
329. For cultural-based reasoning, see generally BRUNO S. FREY & WERNER W. POMMEREHNE, 
MUSES AND MARKETS: EXPLORATIONS IN THE ECONOMICS OF THE ARTS 59–60 (1989); William D. 
Grampp, Rent-Seeking in Arts Policy, 60 PUB. CHOICE 113 (1989); Susanne Krebs & Werner W. 
Pommerehne, Politico-Economic Interactions of German Public Performing Arts Institutions, 19 J. 
CULTURAL ECON. 17 (1995); Günther G. Schulze & Anselm Rose, Public Orchestra Funding in 
Germany–An Empirical Investigation, 22 J. CULTURAL ECON. 227 (1998). 
330. It is important to note that books are not a homogeneous product. Books are different in many 
ways. Models of monopolistic competition may be more suited to analyzing the free book market than 
are models of perfect competition. However, arguably, at least within one genre or another (such as 
children’s books, cookbooks, science fiction, poetry, or history) there is great substitutability between 
different books, so one can assume perfect competition in the retail market. 











in a competitive market. On the other hand, when publishers or distributors 
gain monopolistic power—e.g., due to RPM arrangements—they can set a 
higher price for books, which may allow them to cover their fixed costs for 
a smaller quantity of sold books. Therefore, the expected result is that a 
larger variety of books is anticipated under RPM arrangements, although 
their price will be higher than in an unconstrained competitive market. 
Hence, theoretically, RPM arrangements encourage book variety and higher 
market prices.331 
A second theoretical benefit of the RPM arrangement is a wider 
dispersion of bookstores, including small bookstores.332 The reason for this 
is the lack of price competition in the retail market. Competition over book 
prices in a free market provides an advantage for book chains or other large 
entities due to economies of scale, and hence small shops find it difficult to 
compete on book prices.333 A uniform price arrangement eliminates the 
competitive benefit of large retailers and allows larger profit margins for 
bookstores.334 These two effects enable the existence of more bookstores, a 
correspondingly better dispersion of bookstores, and in turn improved 
access to readers. Furthermore, the lack of price competition among 
bookstores does not eliminate competition altogether, but instead directs 
competition to non-price components, such as sale services—consulting, 
training, and so forth. These components are also considered valuable and 
necessary in the book market to facilitate better access.335 
It should be emphasized that a better geographic dispersion of 
bookstores, which is expected under an RPM arrangement, does not 
necessarily indicate that a narrower spread of bookstores represents a 
market failure. There are social costs to a wider distribution of points of sale 
of any kind, and consumer savings due to store proximity do not necessarily 
outweigh the costs involved in creating such improved access. Indeed, 
conventional economic analysis does not treat dispersion of retailers under 
an RPM arrangement as an advantage of this regime.336 However, arguably, 
 
331. See supra Part I.C The Objectives of Modern RPM Regulation. 
332. See generally THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF ECON., 
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 161–62 (1983); 
Mathewson & Winter, supra note 315, at 81–82; see also Aday Hernández & Juan Luis Jiménez, Do 
Supermarkets Reduce the Number of Traditional Bookshops? An Empirical Application to the Textbook 
Market in Spain 4–5 (Ass’n for Cultural Econ. Int’l, Working Paper No. AWP-02-2011, 2011), http://w 
ww.culturaleconomics.org/awp/AWP-02-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T6N-LZZX]. 
333. See also CAVES, supra note 298, at 155–57. 
334. If the number of publishers is not large, the advantage of large margins for small shops is 
eliminated. 
335. Although higher profit margins for bookstores allow them to invest both in the establishment 
of stores and in giving related services, these investments are substitutes in the sense that both utilize a 
store’s extra profit due to RPM arrangement. Thus, as more stores are opened (representing an 
investment in accessibility and storage), we should expect a smaller scope of related services. 












unlike other products, bookstores enjoy an additional social value—cultural 
value. Since books are cultural products, their accessibility may possess an 
additional unique social value, which exceeds the sum of the individual 
benefit from book consumption. 
Even if the geographic dispersion of bookstores allows for greater 
accessibility, one should note the shortcomings of the RPM arrangement in 
achieving this accessibility. First, ensuring high profit margins to retailers 
harms innovation in the distribution and marketing of books. Distribution 
tools that are more efficient and cheaper than traditional systems of 
bookstores may allow cost savings to be delivered to consumers by reducing 
the price of books, which, importantly, is also an element of accessibility.337 
Such innovation is avoided when book prices are fixed. Second, lower costs 
of book delivery and more extensive use of electronic versions of books 
diminish the importance of geographical proximity to the bookstore and the 
variety of books held in stock. Online bookstores offer a very wide range of 
books, a great deal of information about them, and accompanying services 
comparable—or even superior—to those offered by physical bookstores.338 
Lastly, “accessibility” to books is not only a function of commuting costs 
to bookstores that hold a sufficient variety of books, but also, as noted, of 
the price of books. If the regulatory instrument that brings about dispersion 
of points of sale inevitably also leads to an increase in the prices of books, 
accessibility may actually be harmed. 
Some argue that although an RPM arrangement allows for higher prices 
and thus monopolistic profits, publishers and bookstores will use these 
excess profits from successful books (such as best sellers) to cross-subsidize 
books whose demand has turned out to be limited.339 Cross-subsidization by 
monopolistic profits will allow for better variety of books in the market. 
Such cross-subsidies may be particularly supportive of “high-quality” 
books.340 However, the cross-subsidy justification for the RPM arrangement 
is questionable. The incentive to create cross-subsidization between 
expected successes and failures facing uncertainty exists in any case. Even 
in a competitive market, manufacturers will seek to expand their production 
variety facing uncertainty of product success.341 The interesting question is 
if we should expect an additional incentive by manufacturers to use their 
 
337. See Martos & Martos, supra note 60, at 144. 
338. See, e.g., OECD Roundtable 2008, supra note 29, at 56. 
339. See, e.g., Appelman, supra note 90; Michael A. Utton, Books Are Not Different After All: 
Observations on the Formal Ending of the Net Book Agreement in the UK, 7 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 115 
(2000); see also Martos & Martos, supra note 60, at 143–45; Van Der Ploeg, supra note 170. 
340. Note that the very intention of supporting “high-quality” books involves difficult problems. 
See infra note 355. 
341. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 











excess monopolistic profit for extra cross-subsidization. This is not a 
necessary result.342 
In conclusion, the main goals of the RPM arrangements in the book 
markets of various European countries are to increase the variety of books 
and improve access to books. These goals probably serve the broader 
purpose of supporting and promoting a country’s culture. The economic-
theoretical analysis indicates that RPM arrangements may indeed increase 
the variety of books published in the market.343 The theoretical effect on 
consumer accessibility to books is not unequivocal and may turn out to be 
negative due to various opposing effects, in particular due to an expected 
increase in book prices and a reduction in the amount of books consumed, 
which also represent a harm to social welfare due to RPM arrangements. 
The positive analysis is only the first step toward social decision-making. 
The next necessary step, which builds on positive analysis, is normative. 
B. Normative Analysis 
So far, we have seen that a regulatory arrangement of RPM may, though 
not necessarily will, achieve social objectives that are ostensibly desirable 
in the book market—increasing literary diversity and possibly improving 
the public’s access to books and, as a result, promoting a country’s culture. 
Yet this regulatory arrangement incurs social costs, which were also 
discussed above. In order to formulate social policy or make public 
decisions, such as that of regulation in the book market, normative valuation 
is unavoidable. We must evaluate the expected social benefits of an RPM 
arrangement in the book market against its expected social costs. We should 
place social values on the positive effects of regulation. Generally, we 
would like to find a certain balance—the proper balance—between 
achieving socially desirable goals and the costs of realizing them. 
Economists denote this balance a cost-benefit analysis.344 To this end, we 
 
342. See Canoy et al., supra note 323, at 747–48; see also supra notes 168–171 and accompanying 
text. 
343. The economic implication of the diversity objective in book markets is a market structure of 
monopolistic competition. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. If the appropriate analytical 
framework for the book market is one of monopolistic competition, then we should be less concerned 
about the problems of variety in the market. See KELVIN LANCASTER, VARIETY, EQUITY AND 
EFFICIENCY: PRODUCT VARIETY IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 179–223 (1979); Avinash K. Dixit & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 
(1977); Kelvin Lancaster, The Economics of Product Variety: A Survey, 9 MARKETING SCI. 189 (1990) 
[hereinafter Lancaster, Survey]. If so, the social value of the regulatory arrangement of RPM decreases. 
344. Cost-benefit analysis is considered the proper method for social evaluation of regulatory 
rules. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 












must evaluate the social variables—goals and costs—pertinent to an RPM 
regulatory regime.345  
The objectives of RPM regulation in European book markets include 
promoting literature and preserving cultural diversity. These are quite 
general goals; they are not well-defined and can be understood in countless 
ways. Additionally, without assigning value to the laws’ objectives, it is 
impossible to assess the laws’ desirability or the optimal design of these 
regulatory measures (e.g., duration of the desired protection, the proper 
extent of protection over different types of books, or the appropriate types 
of exceptions). 
Assigning social values to laws’ objectives is necessary both for 
assessing their expected desirability ex ante, and for judging their success 
or failure ex post. For example, should we examine the change in the 
quantity of books after a period of implementation of the laws? Does it 
matter what kinds of books have been published (such as original or 
translated; “high-brow” or popular)? Should we examine the change in the 
variety of books? How should we assess any change in the prices of books? 
Should we examine other cultural variables, such as ethos or heritage? How 
would we weigh these variables? For example, if due to RPM arrangements 
in the book market, book prices are higher and consumption of books 
decreases, but the variety of books improves, more “quality” books are 
written and read, and the public becomes immersed in culture, is that law 
successful?  
Surprisingly, in European countries, where regulatory and tax 
arrangements have been used for many years to intervene in and support the 
book market, no normative point of view is found. One finds only positive 
data on European book markets and attempts to compare the data across 
countries and legal arrangements. Comparisons across countries are not 
sufficiently informative, since countries differ in many respects, apart from 
their applicable legal arrangements.346 For example, once a uniform price 
arrangement for books was canceled in the United Kingdom, the number of 
bookstores decreased, as expected under the economic model.347 Yet, when 
a similar arrangement was canceled in France for a certain time period, the 
number of bookstores increased.348 A simple comparison of data, without 
controlling for other relevant variables, can be erroneous. Examining only 
certain variables—such as the number of retailers—and not others provides 
 
345. We implicitly adopt a consequentialist normative approach. Other normative approaches may 
be alternatively considered, but in general, the following normative discussion cannot be avoided. 
346. See Løyland & Ringstad, supra note 66, at 240–42 (giving examples).  
347. See supra notes 332–338 and accompanying next. 
348. See Van Der Ploeg, supra note 170; see also Hernández & Jiménez, supra note 332 
(providing results); cf. supra notes 284–288 and accompanying text. 











only a partial picture of the legal effect. And looking at the whole picture 
requires weighing variables—i.e., it requires assignment of social values. 
Although RPM arrangements in book markets are customary in some 
European countries, their normative basis is unclear. Outside of Europe, few 
countries adopt such regulatory arrangements in book markets.349 Even 
among European countries, where these arrangements began to emerge in 
the nineteenth century, it is not possible to identify a clear legal trend. 
Although there are countries that have enacted RPM regimes in recent years, 
at the same time, other countries have cancelled long-standing RPM 
arrangements or refused to adopt new ones.350  
The main problem, in our opinion, is the complete absence of a 
normative discussion of the RPM arrangements adopted in European book 
markets. It is the kind of discussion that may be expected in examining RPM 
arrangements under the rule of reason standard in the United States. We 
therefore wish to present below the basis for the necessary normative 
discussion and to begin paving the way for a normative analysis of RPM 
arrangements in the case of book markets. The following normative 
discussion is divided between the general goals of promoting culture and 
literature and that of increasing diversity. 
1. Culture, Art, and Literature 
The objectives of European states’ laws prescribing RPM arrangements 
are to regulate the book and literature markets specifically and the fields of 
art and culture more generally.351 The general justification for protective 
regulation of art—including literature—is based on the social value 
attributed to culture and cultural goods, or goods that preserve or create 
culture. Thus, the common argument, in its application to books, is that 
books are unique and not similar to other market goods.352 Books are 
cultural goods, and as a cultural good, they require special public treatment, 
and therefore should not be subject to market forces and competitive 
pressures.353 Free markets with profit-motivated suppliers are likely to only 
incentivize publishing best sellers and best-selling authors that provide 
greater profits at the expense of printing books that may not have an obvious 
audience, despite their potentially fine literary or cultural value. A book 
market based on market forces gives no value to culture, identity, heritage, 
and more. It is arguable that the purpose of European laws is, inter alia, to 
 
349. See supra Part I.D. RPM Arrangements in European and Other Countries’ Book Markets. 
350. For a review, see OECD Roundtable 2008, supra note 29; KURSCHUS, supra note 90. 
351. See supra Part I.C. The Objectives of Modern RPM Regulation. 
352. See Appelman, supra note 90; Dearnley, supra note 35, at 22–24. 












incentivize the production of books that carry these values—books that are 
of high cultural or literary value—although they do not enjoy sufficient 
demand among readers. These are apparently books that are consumed by 
high-quality or special-taste readers—i.e., high-brow consumption.  
This analysis of competitive markets is similarly applicable to the variety 
goal of RPM regulation. Free markets may reduce literary diversity and 
settle for literature of low cultural value and bestsellers. There is a concern 
that free markets encourage the production of books with a broader common 
denominator, which is expressed in a low cultural rank and in books that 
represent entertainment consumption354—that is, literature of a low culture 
character at the expense of literature that represents a high culture one.355 
Works of literary value face the risk of lack of publicity or reduction of their 
cultural value—i.e., dumbing down—for marketing purposes.356 
Accordingly, state intervention may prove useful—whether through 
monetary compensation for culture or through regulatory means—in order 
to avoid these free market results. We will explicitly discuss the normative 
basis for such claims. In particular, we wish to show that not only do 
European laws lack the normative basis required for both their enactment 
and evaluation over time, but the conceivable normative basis itself is 
subject to dispute. 
a. Definition and Meaning 
The term “culture” is difficult to define and delineate, and it has no clear 
and unique meaning. There are different meanings and various definitions 
and descriptions of “culture,” and they vary across scholarly research and 
even among scholars within certain fields.357 It seems that there is more 
disagreement than agreement on this issue. David Throsby organizes the 
ways the term “culture” is used by dividing it into two parts.358 He contrasts 
culture “in an anthropological sense, meaning shared values, customs, ways 
of life, etc” with its “functional sense, meaning activities such as the practice 
 
354. For an analysis of the potential factors for creating cultural goods that appeal to a broad 
common denominator, see TYLER COWEN, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS 
CHANGING THE WORLD’S CULTURES ch. 5 (2002). 
355. It should be explicitly noted that the ability to identify, classify, or describe cultural goods 
with high vs. low social value is greatly doubtful. Its application in reality is doubtful as well as the 
societal gain. 
356. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 189–209 
(1995) (discussing these effects).  
357. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 87 (rev. 
ed. 1983) (“Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language.”); see 
also A. L. KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND 
DEFINITIONS 77–141 (1963) (surveying interdisciplinary definitions of culture). 
358. DAVID THROSBY, THE ECONOMICS OF CULTURAL POLICY 16 (2010). 











of the arts.” 359 Arjo Klamer offers a similar distinction between “culture as 
identity” and “culture as expression,” where the latter describes the arts.360 
We are interested in culture in its expression as art. The definition and 
identification of art, a topic, which is largely discussed in the philosophical 
study of aesthetics, is far from simple. Identifying actions or goods that are 
part of a group of things that constitute art is neither straightforward nor 
uncontroversial. 
For our purposes, we can leave aside the questions of definition and 
identification of art—and derivatively of literature—and assume that they 
are answered in some way or another. Assuming “art” is identified, our 
focus is on legal intervention: should the state intervene with art, and what 
are the nature and boundaries of such intervention? This question has been 
discussed extensively in scholarly literature, especially with regard to public 
finance of art and its creation. Many countries support art through various 
means, such as subsidies, prizes, or tax breaks. Indeed, scholars offer 
justifications for public support of art and guidelines for the appropriate 
degree of such support. 
b. Public Economics 
The discussion of art by economists largely began in the 1960s.361 The 
accepted normative analysis in neo-classical economics is known as 
“welfare economics.” The main justifications for state intervention in the 
market are market failures and wealth redistribution.362 Public goods 
represent a market failure that may justify state intervention, for example, 
by financing their production. In short, a public good is a product with two 
characteristics: (1) many individuals can consume and enjoy the product at 
the same time without harming the consumption or enjoyment of any of 
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Many economists hold the view that art generally represents a group of 
products and services with characteristics of a public good.364 An example 
is a museum or a musical work. If individuals in society enjoy the existence 
of a museum or a musical work, even if they do not visit the museum or 
listen to a musical work, these products have the characteristics of a public 
good. The existence of a museum or a musical work in this case creates 
value for many individuals at the same time without impairing the value (of 
consumption) for any of them. Anyone’s enjoyment of a museum’s 
existence is not impaired by a simultaneous enjoyment of other people of 
that museum. This kind of individual utility is called a “non-use value.” 
Economists describe individual enjoyment of art even if no one consumes 
it directly (non-use values) in three ways.365 The first is the pleasure derived 
from the existence of the product or service. The very existence of a 
museum or a classical work gives pleasure to individuals in society. For 
example, individuals in French society may attribute importance to the 
existence of the Louvre or the Arc de Triomphe, even if they do not intend 
to visit them; they may perceive them as important beyond the enjoyment 
they derive from visiting them. The second source of non-use value is the 
pleasure resulting from the option value of a product or service. The 
existence of an option to consume and enjoy a museum or a classical work 
in the future gives pleasure to individuals who do not rule out such potential 
consumption in the future. The third is the enjoyment that stems from the 
value of endowing valuable goods to future generations. Individuals may 
take pleasure in knowing that different kinds of arts will be available for 
future generations, which will be able to enjoy them.  
Another way to describe the market failure that characterizes art is 
externalities. Externalities represent changes in individuals’ utility that are 
not priced in markets in the way private goods are.366 Externalities are 
inefficient—i.e., a market failure—and hence may justify state intervention. 
Art may include products and services that create positive externalities. That 
is, art may provide utility to individuals in society beyond the consumption 
value of any such product or its price; in this sense, art provides an 
 
364. See, e.g., BRUNO S. FREY, ARTS & ECONOMICS: ANALYSIS & CULTURAL POLICY 111–14 (2d 
ed. 2003); Hans Abbing, On the Rationale of Public Support to the Arts, in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE 
ARTS 34, 39–40 (William S. Hendon et al. eds., 1980); Alan Peacock, Economics, Cultural Values and 
Cultural Policies, J. CULTURAL ECON., Dec. 1991, at 1, 9 [hereinafter Peacock, Cultural Values]; Alan 
Peacock, Welfare Economics and Public Subsidies to the Arts, 37 MANCHESTER SCH. ECON. & SOC. 
STUD. 323, 323–24 (1969), reprinted in 18 J. CULTURAL ECON. 151, 151–52 (1994) [hereinafter 
Peacock, Welfare Economics].  
365. See THROSBY, supra note 358, at 110–11; see also FREY, supra note 364, at 117–19 
(indicating additional potential positive externalities). 
366. For an explanation of externalities, see, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 304, at 81–99; STIGLITZ, 
supra note 304, at 214–33. It should be noted that public goods are, in fact, a case of positive 
externalities. 











additional non-market value. There is no market for trading these extra 
values—hence, positive externalities. Thus, scholars argue that art, such as 
a concert, is socially valuable not only through its consumption—enjoyment 
of attendance at the concert—but also through the pleasure individuals sense 
although they are not present at the concert.367 This kind of pleasure is not 
priced in markets and is not traded in any market. It represents a positive 
externality of art. The value of art is manifested in the three forms listed 
above: existence value, option value, and bequest value.  
These social values, which are reflected in individuals’ utility, can be 
measured, and economists have developed empirical methodologies for 
measuring such values. One of the accepted measures for estimating 
externalities is the willingness-to-pay.368 It is possible to evaluate the 
willingness-to-pay for a public good to ensure that the social investment in 
its production—through public funding—is worthwhile under cost-benefit 
analysis. Several empirical tools were developed to measure willingness-to-
pay, of which the best known is the contingent value method.369 Another 
evaluation method is impact studies, which examine the various positive 
effects of cultural goods.370 
Thus, by means of economic theory and empirical measurement, it is 
possible to justify state intervention in the field of literature and to define 
the boundaries of such intervention. The justification for intervention is the 
existence of market failure. The extent and design of intervention depends 
on the measurement of the social value resulting from the production of 
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literature. Such a measurement would enable the use of cost-benefit analysis 
to assess the extent and form of the state’s support for literature. Arguably, 
literature exhibits a social value that is not priced in the market—non-use 
value. Individuals may enjoy the existence of books of various kinds, even 
if they do not intend to read them. They may enjoy the knowledge that they 
can read them when they wish; they may also benefit from the knowledge 
that the existing literature will be inherited by future generations. 
Measurement of these enjoyments, although certainly not accurate, is 
possible. Based on this kind of assessment of the social value of literature, 
it is possible to examine a state’s proper intervention in the book market,371 
and accordingly to try assessing the desirability of an RPM arrangement or 
the optimal design of such a regime.372 
c. Aesthetics 
There are economists who tend to adopt perceptions of culture and art as 
articulated in the philosophy of aesthetics. They claim that there exists a 
certain detachment of cultural economics from the common analysis of 
welfare economics, and perhaps even from the foundations of neo-classical 
economics.373 In their view, art is expressed in products called “cultural 
goods,” which are distinguished from “ordinary” consumer goods in a 
manner different from that described above.374 Klamer defines a “cultural 
good” in the following way: “the good has cultural value in that it is a source 
of inspiration or symbol of distinction.”375 Throsby defines a cultural good 
in a similar way as a product that provides “cultural value,” such as 
spirituality, aesthetics, or cultural identity, above and beyond the product’s 
commercial value in the market.376 He also presents several examples of 
cultural goods—works of art, musical performances, literature, films and 
television programs, and video games.  
 
371. Obviously, a cost assessment of the RPM arrangement is also needed. The types of costs are 
specified in the theoretical economic analysis above. 
372. There is another related normative course to study RPM arrangements. The economic 
research of culture and art has developed into a field of “cultural economics.” Many economists regard 
this discipline as a sub-field of welfare economics, where a few nuances that are unique to the field of 
culture can be identified and so require special attention and treatment to some extent. One of the 
important examples of the position is the discussion of “cost disease.” See, e.g., William J. Baumol, The 
Arts in the “New Economy,” in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE, supra note 
323, at 339, 346–47. 
373. Klamer, supra note 360, at 139. 
374. See supra Part III.B Section 1.b. 
375. Klamer, supra note 360, at 138. 
376. THROSBY, supra note 358, at 16; see also a definition of cultural goods in Roger McCain, 
Defining Cultural and Artistic Goods, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE, supra 
note 323, at 147, 150–55.  











Throsby discerns three common criteria of cultural goods: their 
production requires human creativity; they are devices for transmitting 
symbolic messages to those who consume them and therefore are also used 
to connect individuals; and they potentially represent intellectual property 
rights that are granted to a person or group of individuals.377 Throsby also 
identifies four sources of cultural values: “arts production and consumption; 
cultural identity and symbolism; cultural diversity; and cultural preservation 
and continuity.”378 
Although the guiding principle of cultural values (and accordingly 
identifying cultural goods that represent art) is shared by economists who 
adopt the aesthetics approach, there is no clear definition of cultural values, 
and there is no consensus among scholars regarding their meaning. Klamer 
denotes the additional values beyond an individuals’ consumption value as 
“social values.”379 These include “belonging, being a member of a group, 
identity, social distinction, freedom, solidarity, trust, tolerance, 
responsibility, love, friendship, and so on.”380 He also relates the term 
“social capital” to these social components.381 Klamer goes on to argue that 
apart from economic values and social values, there are also cultural values 
that are unique to cultural goods.382 Cultural values include “aesthetic, 
spiritual, social, historical, symbolic, and authenticity values.”383 Throsby 
presents a similar, albeit not identical, concept of cultural goods. In general, 
he combines Klamer’s social values and cultural values into one group, 
which he also calls “cultural values.”384 John Holden, who holds similar 
positions, defines cultural values more broadly and includes all the values 
relevant to culture—the economic, social, and cultural values of Klamer and 
 
377. THROSBY, supra note 358, at 16. 
378. Id. at 42–45. 
379. Klamer, supra note 360, at 149. 
380. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
381. Id. at 149–50. 
382. Id. at 150. 
383. Id. (citing DAVID THROSBY, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 28 (2001)); see also Michael Hutter 
& Richard Shusterman, Value and the Valuation of Art in Economic and Aesthetic Theory, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE, supra note 323, at 169. 
384. THROSBY, supra note 358, at 14–22, 111–13; David Throsby, The Production and 
Consumption of the Arts: A View of Cultural Economics, 32 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 4 (1994) 
[hereinafter Throsby, Production and Consumption]. Snowball holds a similar position and notes the 
cultural values of national identity, national pride, public education, the creation of personal 
development, and the creation of brotherhood and solidarity in society. Jen D. Snowball, Cultural Value, 
in A HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS 172, 174 (Ruth Towse ed., 2d ed. 2011). Throsby also ties 
the idea of cultural values to “cultural capital,” which is an asset that contains cultural values or provides 
such values. THROSBY, supra note 358, at 169–72; see also Arjo Klamer, Accounting for Social and 












Throsby.385 Roger McCain goes further and distinguishes between cultural 
values and artistic values.386  
These distinctions between economic values and social or cultural values 
are also related to the accepted distinction in the study of the arts between 
extrinsic values and intrinsic values.387 Extrinsic values, also called 
instrumental values, describe influences of art on individuals and groups in 
society. Intrinsic values are derived from spiritual, emotional, and 
intellectual experience. Contact with and the experience of art give value to 
human life; art possesses intrinsic values in that it can provide people with 
meaning, and create distinct emotional pleasure and stimulation.388 Intrinsic 
values are perceived in the scholarly literature as a value in their own right 
and not due to their consequences or influence in reality. Those who study 
the philosophy of aesthetics generally hold that culture has an intrinsic value 
that is not only detached from and independent of preferences or satisfaction 
of individuals in society, but it is also primary and fundamental to them. 
Separately from aesthetics, scholars argue that cultural goods have 
intrinsic value by characterizing art or cultural goods as “merit goods.”389 
This term is used in public economics literature, yet its economic rationale 
is unclear. Apparently, merit goods are products that are socially valuable 
to supply, independently of the actual demand for the goods by individuals 
in society.390 The claim that cultural goods are merit goods means that they 
possess an intrinsic value, which is not necessarily conditioned on an 
individuals’ utility, and thus establishes the social need for public support 
of their production. However, note that the term merit goods largely 
assumes the desired, normative outcome of public policy, and therefore is 
not useful.391 
These approaches to culture and art face a twofold problem—theoretical 
and empirical. First, a theoretical model should be adopted to facilitate 
normative judgment. If art is expressed in cultural goods, which are unique 
because of their cultural (or other) or intrinsic values, beyond the economic 
values of products, what is their normative meaning or content? How should 
 
385. JOHN HOLDEN, CAPTURING CULTURAL VALUE: HOW CULTURE HAS BECOME A TOOL OF 
GOVERNMENT POLICY 36 (2004). 
386. McCain, supra note 376, at 155–56. 
387. See MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 370, at xv–xvi. But see McCain, supra note 376, at 152–
54. 
388. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 370, at xv. 
389. See David Cwi, Public Support of the Arts: Three Arguments Examined, J. CULTURAL. 
ECON., Dec. 1980, at 39, 39; Throsby, Production and Consumption, supra note 384, at 23. 
390. See Richard A. Musgrave, A Multiple Theory of Budget Determination, 17 
FINANZARCHIV/PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 333, 341 (1957). 
391. See William J. Baumol & Hilda Baumol, Book Review, 89 J. POL. ECON. 425, 426–27 (1981); 
Don Fullerton, On Justifications for Public Support of the Arts, J. CULTURAL. ECON., Dec. 1991, at 67, 
73. 











one weigh various cultural values in public decision-making—such as 
public funding of arts—and how should she allocate scarce public funds 
between different types of art? In order to answer these questions, a 
normative model—or theory—is required that enables value judgments. 
According to the accepted economic approach, which is based on welfare 
economics, one should weigh the effect of certain values on individuals’ 
utility.392 Only values expressed in benefit or satisfaction of individuals in 
society are of normative significance.393 Indeed, cultural values may well 
affect the utility of individuals in society. For example, values of national 
identity, heritage, or spirituality may cause happiness or satisfaction for at 
least some individuals in society. If so, only the empirical problem of 
measurement, which can be overcome, will remain.  
However, the basic concept of these approaches does not conform with 
the normative methodology of welfare economics. Under the aesthetics 
view of culture and art, a measure of cultural values will be expressed 
separately from and independent of an individual’s utility. The social values 
of identity, heritage, aesthetics, spirituality, and others represent a shared, 
collective utility that is separated and detached from the utility of each 
individual member in the group.394 Thus, it is doubtful whether a common 
denominator between cultural values and economic values is feasible, and 
hence overall assessment and public choice may prove impossible.395 When 
the value of a cultural good is endowed to society as a group of individuals 
rather than to each of its many individual members, such value cannot be 
attributed to individuals, i.e., no individual in society prefers this good and 
chooses to consume it. Therefore, this value has no significance under neo-
classical economics, which, as explained above, gives normative meaning 
only to individual utility and preferences.396  
In response, some economists suggest deviating from the neo-classical 
framework when evaluating cultural goods and propose including group 
cultural value as a separate and independent normative consideration.397 
This position is actually more general. It implicitly argues for a different 
system of social decision-making. Perhaps even a different model of social 
choice may function better in this type of decision-making system. In other 
 
392. ROBIN W. BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS (1984); Amartya Sen, 
Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463 (1979). 
393. BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 392; Sen, supra note 392. 
394. See, e.g., THROSBY, supra note 358, at 20–22. 
395. See, e.g., Arjo Klamer, A Pragmatic View on Values in Economics, 10 J. ECON. 
METHODOLOGY 191, 207–08 (2003). 
396. See supra notes 364–365, 392–393 and accompanying text. 
397. See THROSBY, supra note 358, at 20; see also THROSBY, supra note 383. But cf. Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto 












words, in the field of culture and art, cost-benefit methods are not 
appropriate for public decision-making and for designing guidelines for 
public policy.398 Thus, a new normative theory is required. It should (1) 
define the pertinent cultural values and how they are identified in any 
particular cultural good; (2) create an index for estimating these cultural 
values; and (3) propose a way to assign social value to cultural values, and 
accordingly weigh different cultural values among themselves, and between 
them and other non-cultural values (mainly, individual utility). Otherwise, 
it is unclear how to decide questions of public policy, such as public support 
for art. 
It seems that the tasks of defining and identifying cultural values and of 
creating positive proxies for them are not impossible, and there is some 
progress in these areas. Many variables that are related to culture, arts, 
literature, or public goods can be measured in reality.399 Clearly, we must 
develop methodologies for identifying and measuring the variables in a 
reality that are of normative interest, namely, cultural values.400 This is 
possible and even realized in a certain, partial manner.401  
Notwithstanding this progress, there is still no agreement among scholars 
and across research fields on how to measure the “cultural value.” The 
measurement is probably complex and of many dimensions (aesthetics, 
symbolism, spirituality, and historical value) that have no apparent common 
denominator. It is unstable, not constant over time, and comprised of 
components that are too complex to describe quantitatively or even 
 
398. The historian Arthur Schlesinger said:  
I do not believe . . . that the defense of public support need rest on the spillover effects of the 
arts boom . . . . [b]ut the case must be made on the intrinsic value of the arts to society as a 
whole. If the arts are worth pursuing at all, they are worth pursuing for their own sake. 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., America, the Arts, and the Future: The First Nancy Hanks Lecture on the Arts 
and Public Policy, in THE FUTURE OF THE ARTS: PUBLIC POLICY AND ARTS RESEARCH 3, 5 (David B. 
Pankratz & Valerie B. Morris eds., 1990). 
399. See, e.g., THROSBY, supra note 358, at 54–55, 214–30; John C. Gordon & Helen Beilby-
Orrin, International Measurement of the Economic and Social Importance of Culture (OECD Working 
Paper, 2006), https://www.oecd.org/std/na/37257281.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3A5-DPH5].  
400. HOLDEN, supra note 385; BRIAN MCMASTER, DEP’T FOR CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, 
SUPPORTING EXCELLENCE IN THE ARTS: FROM MEASUREMENT TO JUDGMENT 4 (2008), http://webarchi 
ve.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/supportingexcellenceinthe
arts.pdf [https://perma.cc/37Z3-E72K]. There are proposals for the measurement and evaluation of 
“cultural values.” But these are usually subjective measurement methodologies. See, e.g., THROSBY, 
supra note 358. Not only is subjective measurement scientifically challenging, but it can also give off a 
strong odor of paternalism. See Peacock, Cultural Values, supra note 364; Peacock, Welfare Economics, 
supra note 364. 
401. See generally articles in 23 CULTURAL TRENDS 79 (2014); see also ARTS & HUMANITIES 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, Cultural Value Project, https://ahrc.ukri.org/research/fundedthemesandprogramm 
es/culturalvalueproject/ [https://perma.cc/7LEB-JHWH]. 











qualitatively.402 For this reason, there are those who argue, like the 
aestheticians, that a “cultural value” is not necessarily measurable; cultural 
goods are perhaps unique and exceptional cases that should not be subject 
to market assessments and pricing.403 As a recent report on the value of the 
arts explained: 
Intrinsic benefits of the arts are intangible and difficult to define. 
They lie beyond the traditional quantitative tools of the social 
sciences, and often beyond the language of common experience. 
Although many advocates of the arts believe intrinsic benefits are of 
primary importance, they are reluctant to introduce them into the 
policy discussion because they do not believe such ideas will resonate 
with most legislators and policymakers. . . . [T]he arts community is 
expected to focus on tangible results that have broad political 
backing, such as improved educational performance and economic 
development.404 
But even if cultural values can be measured—and some believe that this 
task is possible—measurement is not a sufficient condition. Another 
necessary task, and this is our focus, is to assign values to the measured 
results. This is a necessary condition for normative judgment of culture, arts, 
literature, or public goods, and even more so where state intervention is at 
issue. We must assign the variables a value in reality that can be compared 
on the basis of some common denominator with other values that are of 
socially normative interest. These values must be commensurable, 
otherwise it is not clear how to make judgments and public policy.405 
According to the aesthetics approach, it is arguably impossible to find a 
common denominator that allows for any comparison between things in 
reality, such as works of art; those things are incommensurable.406 Indeed, 
economists who hold these positions and argue that cultural or intrinsic 
values cannot be measured, or that they do not have anything in common 
with economic or instrumental values, have difficulty dealing with 
questions of public policy. They either avoid the public decision-making 
 
402. THROSBY, supra note 358, at 214–15; David Throsby, Determining the Value of Cultural 
Goods: How Much (or How Little) Does Contingent Valuation Tell Us?, 27 J. CULTURAL ECON. 275 
(2003). 
403. THROSBY, supra note 358, at 16; see also Klamer, supra note 360; Snowball, supra note 384. 
404. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 370, at 37–38. 
405. In principle, measurement does not have to be quantitative. It is possible, under certain 
conditions, to suffice with qualitative measurement. For suggestions for such a measurement of cultural 
values, see THROSBY, supra note 358, at 29–30; see also Snowball & Webb, supra note 369. 
406. This approach is also prominent in the field of law. See, e.g., Matthew Adler, 
Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PENN L. REV. 1371 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, 












question, answer it with pathos and without foundation,407 or honestly admit 
that they do not know how to draw conclusions regarding public policy.408 
We do not hold this position. We do not understand how one can think 
of public policy that requires normative judgment and choice among 
different possibilities without any measurement or assessment of these 
possibilities.409 Moreover, even in the arts, it seems that the dominant 
position is that not only is there a need for evaluation and measurement, but 
it is also possible to do so.410 Various entities that deal with art in reality on 
a daily basis—such as museums, orchestras, or theaters—choose, in some 
way, what works or artists to finance or promote (privately or publicly). 
Various systems of assessment and critique of artworks were developed and 
function in reality. They produce assessments and measurements of quality 
or artistic values.  
In conclusion, if a law aims to support culture and promote literature, as 
European countries’ laws prescribing RPM regulation of book markets do, 
it is impossible to avoid a normative analysis of these goals. Such analysis 
requires the identification and definition of the social values supported by 
the law, a normative framework (theory) for their assessment, and 
measuring tools. We discussed possible ways of realizing such assessment 
and a corresponding normative decision regarding the promotion of culture 
and literature through RPM arrangements. We do not seek a decisive policy 
decision on this matter, but rather bring to the forefront the absence of a 
relevant normative discussion in the hearts of the laws. 
2. Diversity 
Similar to the normative analysis of culture, it is impossible to avoid a 
normative analysis of diversity, which is one of the main motivations for 
RPM arrangements in book markets.411 The social and political discussion 
of cultural and literary diversity is not unique to E.U. countries.412 For 
example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”) has been involved in cultural diversity since the 
1950s. In 2001, the organization adopted the Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity,413 and, in 2005, members of the organization opened for 
 
407. See, e.g., MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 370, at 71–74. 
408. See THROSBY, supra note 358, at 53–56. 
409. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1419 (1998). 
410. See, e.g., MCMASTER, supra note 400 (recommending a measure of “cultural excellence,” 
innovation, and risk-taking). 
411. See supra Part I.C. The Objectives of Modern RPM Regulation. 
412. See generally supra Part I. The Arrangement of Book Prices in Europe and Beyond. 
413. U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. (UNESCO), Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 
UNESCO Doc. CLT-2002/WS/9 (Nov. 2, 2001), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000127160. 











signature the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions, which entered into force in 2007.414 The aim of 
cultural and literary diversity is prominent in the goals of many countries, 
which also emphasize the importance of diversity. As with the above 
discussion pertaining to the promotion of literature, the question of diversity 
also raises questions of normative approach and empirical means, which 
first require the identification and definition of diversity. 
a. Definition and Meaning 
The first inquiry is of the identification and definition of diversity, 
whether it is cultural variety, literary variety, or a variety of books. The 
definition of cultural or literary diversity, and accordingly the identification 
of such diversity, is not simple.415 Richard Caves emphasizes the “infinite 
variety” that exists in the book market.416 In his opinion, the number of titles 
published is a measure of diversity.417 Tyler Cowen also thinks of diversity 
in terms of the quantity of cultural goods supplied in the market.418 It seems 
that other economists also adopt, whether explicitly or implicitly, the 
number of titles as a measure of diversity.419 Cultural diversity has been 
studied and measured empirically in other art fields, such as television 
broadcasts,420 movies,421 and music.422 These studies use the quantity of 
products or the quantity of new or additional products to measure diversity. 
However, this is not the only available measure. Various studies of 
culture have proposed several different measures for estimating cultural 
 
414. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, opened 
for signature Oct. 20, 2005, 2440 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force Mar. 18, 2007), https://en.unesco.org/ 
creativity/sites/creativity/files/passeport-convention2005-web2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGA3-VJWE] 
[hereinafter Convention on Cultural Diversity]. 
415. For example, the Convention on Cultural Diversity defines cultural diversity in an intuitive, 
but neither general nor operative way:  
“Cultural diversity” refers to the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and societies 
find expression. . . . Cultural diversity is made manifest not only through the varied ways in 
which the cultural heritage of humanity is expressed, augmented and transmitted through the 
variety of cultural expressions, but also through diverse modes of artistic creation, production, 
dissemination, distribution and enjoyment, whatever the means and technologies used.  
Id. at art. 4(1).  
416. CAVES, supra note 298, at 146–47. 
417. Id. at 155–56. 
418. COWEN, supra note 353, at 53–55. 
419. See Canoy et al., supra note 323; Van Der Ploeg, supra note 170. 
420. See Joëlle Farchy & Heritiana Ranaivoson, Do Public Television Channels Provide More 
Diversity than Private Ones?, 1 ENCATC J. CULTURAL MGMT. & POL’Y 50 (2011). 
421. See François Moreau & Stéphanie Peltier, Cultural Diversity in the Movie Industry: A Cross-
National Study, 17 J. MEDIA ECON. 123 (2004). 
422. See Heritiana Ranaivoson, The Determinants of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: An 
International Quantitative Analysis of Diversity of Production in the Recording Industry, 4 












diversity. It appears that there is significant similarity between the diversity 
indices proposed in cultural studies and the various indices that were 
proposed and measured in other areas of research, such as economics 
(variety of products), biology (biodiversity), finance (risk diversification), 
psychology (psychological diversity), and communication (media sources 
and formats).423 Having used similar measures in different fields of study 
may assist in learning from one use or application to another. Ranaivoson 
reviews the development of diversity indices in various research fields and 
various studies and demonstrates the general similarity in measuring 
diversity.424 She shows that Andrew Stirling’s proposal for measuring 
diversity generalizes the various proposals for such measure.425 
Stirling suggests measuring diversity through three variables: variety, 
balance, and disparity.426 First, we should divide the evaluated system into 
different types or categories (by use, content, location, etc.). Variety 
represents the number of different types or categories.427 As the number of 
categories in a given system increases, diversity grows. Thus, the quantity 
of products (or the quantity of new products)—the index that was previously 
offered for diversity in the book market—serves as an indirect proxy for 
variety. A larger number of products implies greater likelihood of multiple 
categories. Additional measures of variety may be directly based on the 
number of categories or groups, according to different divisions of the 
system and following different characteristics for division into categories. 
Examples from the field of books may be the number of published genres 
or the number of languages translated into the local language.  
The variable balance describes how each of the categories is 
represented.428 The more uniform the representation of different categories 
(e.g., distribution of products over more uniform categories) or the smaller 
the gap in the representation of the different categories, the greater the 
 
423. See Andrew Stirling, On the Economics and Analysis of Diversity 37 (Univ. of Sussex Sci. 
Policy Research Unit, Electronic Working Papers Series No. 28, 1998), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ 
08e8/fb40fdbfd91fec63fc632d91b7dbc5779ea1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DJP-UV64] (collecting 
academic studies of diversity in a range of fields); Richard Van der Wurff, Competition, Concentration 
and Diversity in European Television Markets, 29 J. CULTURAL ECON. 249 (2005); Daniel G. McDonald 
& John Dimmick, The Conceptualization and Measurement of Diversity, 30 COMM. RES. 60 (2003). 
424. Heritiana Ranaivoson, Measuring Cultural Diversity: A Review of Existing Definitions 
(Sept. 2007) (unpublished research paper), http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/measurin 
g-cultural-diversity-a-review-of-existing-definitions-2007-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ2X-2TGB]. 
425. Id. at 20–21. For other proposals of diversity measurement, see CLAUDE E. SHANNON & 
WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949); Kenneth Junge, 
Diversity of Ideas About Diversity Measurement, 35 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 16 (1994); E. H. 
Simpson, Measurement of Diversity, 163 NATURE 688 (1949); Martin L. Weitzman, On Diversity, 107 
Q.J. ECON. 363 (1992). 
426. See Andy Stirling, A General Framework for Analysing Diversity in Science, Technology 
and Society, 4 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE 707, 710 (2007); Stirling, supra note 423, at 39. 
427. Stirling, supra note 423, at 39. 
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diversity. Typical balance indices measure the proportion of each category 
or type. For example, with books, it would use the quantity of books sold of 
any kind in proportion to the total sales of books.429  
The third component, disparity, indicates the difference or discrepancy 
between different categories.430 Lesser resemblance between different 
categories implies more diversity; the farther away the various categories 
are from each other, in terms of Harold Hotelling,431 the more diverse is the 
system. It should be noted that it is difficult to develop disparity measures 
that are quantitative, reliable, and objective.432 Empirical studies on 
diversity have begun using these variables, and a few empirical studies on 
cultural diversity have actually used the diversity index as a function of 
these three variables.433 
Estimating these variables empirically is only the first positive step. Each 
of them in itself testifies to a certain degree or aspect of diversity; however, 
only their totality yields, apparently, a good estimation of diversity. The 
three variables (sometimes each of which is composed of several 
components that require weighting themselves) must therefore be weighted 
into a unified measure of diversity. It is possible to think of different 
approaches to creating weighted metrics.434  
For example, Stirling chooses an axiomatic approach. In his view, 
weighting must retain several attributes, which we believe and are 
convinced are important for such an index.435 It should be noted that an 
axiomatic approach, adopting a few essential attributes, does not necessarily 
 
429. The well-known index of Herfindahl-Hirschman is a weighting of the two variables—
balance and variety. See Stephen A. Rhoades, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 
188 (1993).  
430. Stirling, supra note 423, at 40. 
431. See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929).  
432. Stirling, supra note 423, at 87–88. 
433. See Françoise Benhamou & Stéphanie Peltier, How Should Cultural Diversity Be Measured? 
An Application Using the French Publishing Industry, 31 J. CULTURAL. ECON. 85 (2007) [hereinafter 
Benhamou & Peltier, French Publishing]; Farchy & Ranaivoson, supra note 420; Ranaivoson, supra 
note 422; Françoise Benhamou & Stéphanie Peltier, Application of the Stirling Model in Assessing 
Diversity Using UIS Cinema Data, in MEASURING THE DIVERSITY OF CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS: 
APPLYING THE STIRLING MODEL OF DIVERSITY IN CULTURE: TWO CASE STUDIES 9 (UNESCO Inst. for 
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vs. actual diversity. See COWEN, supra note 353, at 53–55; Benhamou & Peltier, French Publishing, 
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and bookstores. See Ranaivoson, supra note 424, at 7. 












result in a unique weighted index. There may be some measures that will 
sustain these traits. Thus, the weighted index suggested by Stirling is not the 
only one. In addition, we must first agree on the essential characteristics of 
a weighted index of diversity. Lack of consensus results in a large set of 
potential indicators of diversity.436 Finally, the characteristics necessary for 
a weighted index of diversity and the weighting of the variables may vary 
over different phenomena in reality. For example, important attributes of 
diversity in culture may differ from those that are important for measuring 
diversity in technology. 
b. Normative Analysis 
Once all those obstacles are overcome—choosing a method of defining 
and measuring the relevant variables, selecting how to weigh them into a 
measure of diversity, and identifying the phenomena in reality that we seek 
to estimate—we end up with a positive, measurable index of diversity. An 
empirical measure of diversity is not sufficient for the purpose of normative 
analysis. Similarly, to the discussion of culture and art, a value should be 
assigned to diversity. An assessment of the social importance or the public 
need for diversity is required in order to make judgments that are necessary 
for public policy, such as the design of regulatory arrangements in the book 
market. How much diversity is appropriate?  
An important source for the social value of diversity is individual 
preferences. A common assumption in economic studies is that consumers 
prefer, and hence value, diversity. Economists identify two sources of the 
value of diversity.437 One is the variety of preferences of individuals in 
society. If different individuals in society exhibit different tastes, a wider 
range of products will better conform to individual preferences. For 
example, if different consumers prefer to consume non-identical products, 
producing and delivering more diverse products will better suit each 
individual’s preferences. The second source is the preference of each 
individual in society for diversity. Individuals benefit from the existence of 
a variety, independent of their actual use of all varied items. A possible 
explanation for this preference is that individuals expect that various 
potential situations in reality would require various items from a variety. 
For example, an individual would normally prefer to drive her private car, 
but in harsh weather conditions, she might prefer to ride the train.438 The 
individual will therefore have a preference for diverse means of 
transportation. Accordingly, it is possible to develop methodologies for 
 
436. See, e.g., Ranaivoson, supra note 424. 
437. KELVIN LANCASTER, MODERN CONSUMER THEORY (1991); Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 343.  
438. Wing Suen, The Value of Product Diversity, 43 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 217, 217 (1991). 











estimating the value of diversity based on its impact on individual’s utility. 
It can also be argued, similarly to the discussion above on culture and 
art, that diversity itself provides pleasure and satisfaction to individuals in 
society. The very existence of a variety of cultures and cultural expressions 
per se, regardless of their use or consumption by individuals, creates 
enjoyment.439 Being aware of the reality of diversity may be sufficient. This 
is a description of the existence value, which gives cultural diversity the 
characteristics of a public good (or of a positive externality).440 Perhaps the 
option value of literary or cultural diversity generates utility to individuals 
in society. And maybe diversity also yields a bequest value—the social 
value of imparting diversity to future generations. These values can be 
measured. 
Throsby further argues that cultural diversity has a value derived from 
the interconnectedness of the cultural world.441 No culture lives in isolation. 
If phenomena and expressions of culture are isolated, culture will stagnate 
and disappear; therefore, such a network of cultural diversity is valuable.442 
He goes so far as to argue that cultural diversity exhibits social value 
because certain cultural expressions may have future value that is not yet 
recognized.443 Therefore, we should be wary of a loss of cultural phenomena 
and keep more cultural options for the future.444 Yet, these claimed social 
values are unclear and hence not easily measurable, if at all. 
The ways we choose to define diversity and assign social value to it affect 
the normative assessment of diversity. If diversity is valued through 
individual preferences only, no market failure necessarily exists. We may 
find that free book markets, lacking state intervention, provide an adequate 
variety of books (or writers, publishers, or bookstores). Yet, adequate or 
optimal diversity is contingent on other variables such as market structure 
or market size.445 It also depends on supply-side economies: available 
economies of scale reduce variety, whereas economies of scope in 
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production foster variety.446 Generally, economies of scale allow cost 
reduction for lower variety, while economies of scope enable reduction in 
production costs with more variety. Thus, for sufficiently large economies 
of scope, market variety can be optimal.447  
The application to book markets obviously requires empirical estimation, 
and it depends on the specific book market examined. But generally, it 
seems that, on the one hand, book production incurs relatively high fixed 
costs and low marginal costs, which signify economies of scale; on the other 
hand, much of the capital invested in the publication of a book of one type 
can also be used for publishing a book of a different type.448  
If diversity exhibits public good characteristics, or it generates positive 
externalities, its public support may be granted. These market failures imply 
that expected diversity in a free market will be inadequate.  
Therefore, assuming diversity is sub-optimal in free book markets, the 
possibility of expanding it through corrective intervention should be 
examined. In order to evaluate the extent to which diversity should be 
widened, a normative assessment of diversity, as presented above, is 
essential. The social (or other) value of expanded diversity should be traded 
off with its costs.  
For this purpose, an estimation of the value of widening diversity is 
required. If the value of diversity stems from consumers’ preferences or 
from its public good nature, then the value of diversity can be estimated by 
methods such as those discussed above regarding culture and art. If, on the 
other hand, the value of diversity stems from a network of connections 
between different cultural expressions or from a possible future that is 
unknown and cannot be assessed, in the absence of an objective scientific 
methodology for estimating such values, we will face a normative stalemate. 
In conclusion, we do not doubt that cultural diversity, literary diversity, 
and a variety of books have social value. Our argument is that the discussion 
presented here cannot be avoided when we face social decisions involving 
diversity, such as those in European laws regulating book markets. While 
RPM regulation of the book market is expected to expand the range of 
books, this regulatory arrangement incurs costs; in particular, it leads to 
higher prices and reduced consumption of books. To the extent that the 
social benefit of RPM arrangements is expressed in a wider range of books, 
one need not only show that increased diversity of books is socially 
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beneficial, but also assess the social value of increasing diversity. This 
cannot be done without identifying and defining books’ diversity and 
without the ability to estimate it.449 Indeed, pointing to the right answer is 
complex, but our goal, as stated, is to present the type of discussion and 
normative analysis required concerning diversity. 
CONCLUSIONS 
RPM arrangements are tricky. They have encountered all kinds of legal 
treatments: they have been forbidden; they have been allowed (with or 
without restrictions); and in some European book markets they are 
mandated. This Article demonstrated the discussion and analysis needed for 
examining RPM arrangements with a particular focus on the regulatory 
arrangements in European book markets. The Article went from the widely 
discussed positive economic analysis of RPM regulation and stepped 
forward toward a normative analysis of such a regime’s goals and expected 
results. Surprisingly enough, this kind of normative analysis is almost 
completely missing from the literature on these European laws.  
The analysis we present here consists of many parts, each of which is in 
itself non-trivial, and therefore, the normative framework becomes quite 
complex. However, we do not argue that a thorough and complete analysis 
must be conducted in order to arrive at a precise and certain conclusion 
beyond any regulatory or judicial doubt. Our argument is that this discussion 
and analysis do not take place at all in the context of the European laws. To 
avoid arbitrary public decisions and unfounded regulatory legislation, we 
must face the normative challenge. If we seek meaning and purpose in RPM 
regimes, we should carefully consider their goals; if we are wary of the 
methods and extent of state intervention in individuals’ lives, we should not 
be indifferent to the regulatory arrangements adopted in these laws. This 
Article, using the context of Europe’s well-entrenched regulation of book 
markets, demonstrated what is required to address the normative challenge 
of RPM regimes. 
This kind of analysis cannot be avoided and is necessary for such legal 
decisions by regulators or judges. That is, intuitions are insufficient. Slogans 
such as fair trade, culture, or heritage cannot suffice. They obviously cannot 
serve as a satisfactory rationale for the adoption of RPM arrangements. Yet, 
similar claims seem to be the reasons for the adoption of book RPM regimes 
in European countries. These reasons also played a vital role in past 
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adoption of “fair trade” laws allowing RPM arrangements in most American 
states. 
This normative exercise is relevant and necessary for any RPM regime. 
Moreover, it has gained much importance in the United States following the 
Leegin decision, which now subjects RPM arrangements to a rule of reason 
scrutiny, rather than barring them as outright illegal.450 The rule of reason 
analysis requires exactly this kind of normative analysis by both antitrust 
regulators and judges. Lacking a normative theoretical basis for RPM 
arrangements, one cannot examine and assess regulatory regimes (such as 
fair-trade laws or regulation of European book markets) either ex ante or ex 
post—e.g., contesting them in court. Additionally, a normative account of 
RPM arrangements facilitates public debate and empirical examination. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, it should be emphasized that this Article 
does not necessarily advocate the elimination of RPM regulation in book 
markets or its rejection under American antitrust laws, but rather introduces 
an example of a workable theoretical framework for its analysis. 
Lastly, the normative discussion here is admittedly incomplete. The 
focus is only on RPM arrangements as a social instrument. Yet, the same 
social goals may be accomplished through other means. That is, even if 
RPM arrangements are socially beneficial in certain circumstances, other 
social mechanisms may prove superior. It is an instrument choice question. 
It is a necessary additional step in social decision-making which is ignored 
in this Article. For example, in the case of book markets, other legal tools 
can potentially affect culture and literature. Culture and art can be supported 
through grants and subsidies. Grants can be given to authors based on a 
variety of criteria that represent social values or quality. Another acceptable 
way to accomplish such goals is through granting subsidies to books and 
other cultural products through a value-added tax (VAT) exemption for their 
consumption. Some European countries have adopted these instruments in 
addition to their RPM regimes (rather than as a substitute). 
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